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ABSTRACT
This thesis studies the role of product and labor market frictions for the propa-
gation of shocks in closed and open economy.
The rst chapters focuses on the consequences of relaxing product and labor
regulation for macroeconomic outcomes. Specically, we study long and short to
medium run e¤ects of deregulation by developing a Dynamic Stochastic General
Equilibrium model featuring endogenous producer entry and search and matching
frictions in the labor market. We calibrate the model to reproduce salient features
of countries belonging to the Euro Area which are characterized by large barriers to
entry, ring restrictions and unemployment benets. We analyze the e¤ects of single
policy changes and a global reform in which product and labor market regulations
are set at the current U.S. level. Three main results emerge. First, we show that
deregulation either partial or global - would trigger adjustment costs in the short
run, increasing unemployment and reducing consumption. Long run welfare gains
would make up for short run costs. Second, reforms are interdependent as the e¤ects
of a policy change in one market depend upon the level of regulation prevailing in
the other. Third, regulation has important consequences for the business cycle prop-
erties of the economy. After a full deregulation, the Euro Area would become more
responsive to exogenous disturbances but the absorption of shocks would be quicker.
Our ndings suggest that concerns about the negative e¤ect of strict regulation for
the speed of recovery from downturns could be well placed.
The second chapter studies how country-specic labor market frictions hiring
and ring restrictions and protection of unemployed workers  a¤ect the conse-
quences of trade integration. We address this question in a two-country model of
trade and macroeconomic dynamics with heterogeneous rms, endogenous producer
entry, and search and matching frictions in the labor market. We study the dy-
namic e¤ects of trade integration on unemployment and economic activity and the
business cycle implications of stronger trade linkages. The model introduces a novel
source of amplication and propagation of domestic and international shocks, as
uctuations in job creation and destruction a¤ect the protability of producer entry
v
into domestic and export markets. Structural di¤erences in labor markets trans-
late into asymmetric entry and export dynamics across countries. As trade barriers
are reduced, unemployment initially rises (falls) in countries with more rigid (ex-
ible) labor markets. In the long run, average productivity gains ensure positive
employment e¤ects in both countries. Trade is always benecial for welfare, but
the economy with a rigid labor market gains less. Integration has also important
business cycle consequences. In contrast to benchmark international real business
cycle models, but consistent with the data, the model predicts that trade integration
leads to increased business cycle synchronization. Volatility increases in the country
with a rigid labor market, but it falls for the exible partner.
vi
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1Chapter 1
The Macroeconomic Consequences of
(De)Regulation: The Long and the Short of
Reforming Europe.
1.1 Introduction
Product and labor markets in the Euro Area are characterized by high levels of
regulation. OECD Outlook (2004) documents the presence of signicant regulatory
impediments to competition, stringent employment protection legislation and large
unemployment benets. In the recent years the call for reforms has been vigorous.
Public and academic debates has often blamed thick regulation as detrimental for
unemployment outcomes and the ability of the economies to adjust to aggregate
shocks.
This paper aims to shred light on the consequences of deregulating product
and labor market in Europe. Our starting point is empirical evidence documenting
the importance of regulation for macroeconomic outcomes. Strict product market
regulation (henceforth PMR) and labor market regulation (henceforth LMR) nega-
tively a¤ects unemployment rates.1 Furthermore, several papers have established a
connection between regulation and the size of economic uctuations, showing that
cyclical variations in employment and output are related to the level of PMR and
LMR.2 Finally, there is evidence that product and labor market regulation interact
with each other as employment gains from deregulating a given policy are larger
when other forms of regulation are more strict 3
We develop a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium model to address the
main channels through which deregulation in product and labor market could a¤ect
the macroeconomic performance of the rigid Euro Area.
First, we analyze short and long run e¤ects of policy changes, characterizing
the dynamic transition and the long run response to deregulation. In so doing we
1See Gri¢ th et al., Nickell, Nunziata and Ochel (2005), Schiantarelli (2005) and Bertrand and
Kramarz (2002).
2Duval et al. (2007) show that rigidities in labor and product markets dampen the initial
impact of shocks and make their e¤ects more persistent. Micco and Pages (2006), Gomez-Salvador
et al. (2004) nd that more stringent labor laws a¤ects job ows over the business cycle - higher
employment protection leads to lower labor reallocation. Kent et al. (2005) show that stronger
barriers to entry increase aggregate output volatility.
3See Fiori et al., 2008, and Belot and van Ours, 2004.
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are able to account for potential short-run adjustment costs relevant from a welfare
perspective. Second, we focus on the interdependence between product and labor
market reforms and study how the e¤ects of deregulating one market might depend
on the level of regulation prevailing in the other. Third, we address the business
cycle implications of changes in PMR and LMR to investigate how deregulation can
alter the propagation of aggregate shocks.
Our model features an endogenous determination of the number of producers,
labor market frictions and aggregate uncertainty. The endogenous variation of mo-
nopolistically competitive producers is modeled as in Ghironi and Melitz (2005) and
Bilbie, Ghironi and Melitz (2007). To account for the empirical regularity that vari-
ations in the number of producers induce changes in the competitive environment
we allow markups to endogenously vary because of demand side pricing complemen-
tarities. Labor markets are characterized by search frictions with endogenous job
creation and destruction as in Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), augmented with
the introduction of ring costs.
The model can be viewed as a large rm version of the Diamond, Mortensen
and Pissarides framework in which the number of producers endogenously varies
together with the stock of labor. By retaining multiple-worker rms we are able to
distinguish employment outcomes from the behavior of the number of producers in
the economy.4 The number of rms that produce in each period can be interpreted
as the capital stock of the economy since entry is nanced by households through the
accumulation of shares in the portfolio of rms operating in the economy. A unique
feature of our model with endogenous entry and search and matching frictions is
that we can explicitly characterize the interdependence between product and labor
4Under perfect competition in good markets and constant returns to scale the one-worker rm
assumption would be harmless, since the number and size of rms is indeterminate. Under monop-
olistic competition the rms size is determinate and varies according to the demand elasticity faced
by the rms among others. Shao and Silos (2008) introduce a sunk vacancy cost into a small rm
version of the Diamond, Mortensen and Pissarides model - one rm produces with one worker. In
their model entry of workers into production coincides with entry of new producers.
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market dynamics. The behavior of the stock market price of investment captures
the interaction between protability of entry and labor market conditions. Firm
dynamics in turn feed back into labor market outcomes, a¤ecting the evolution of
job creation and destruction in response to aggregate shocks.
The stringency of product market regulation is identied with the size of sunk
entry costs that rms have to pay in order to access the market, reecting admin-
istrative and regulatory barriers to business formation. Labor market regulation
instead is proxied by a joint reduction of unemployment benets and ring costs.5
We address the consequences of reforms in Europe by considering single policy
changes in PMR and LMR and global reforms - a joint deregulation of product and
labor markets. To pin down the size of reforms we lower relevant policy parameters
at their corresponding U.S. levels, a standard benchmark of a exible developed
economy. The mapping between the model parameters and the data make the
analysis transparent.
We show that deregulating product and labor market would trigger important
macroeconomic e¤ects for the Euro Area.
First, deregulation, either partial or global, would be welfare improving. At the
same time the transition following structural reforms could induce adjustment costs
in terms of consumption and unemployment. Following a global reform leading
to a "fully exible" Euro Area, we nd that both consumption and employment
would be lower than their pre-reform steady state level for several quarters before
reaching their new, higher, long run levels. Intuitively, when barriers to entry and
ring restrictions are relaxed, incumbent rms downsize heavily, displacing a large
number of workers. Unemployment spikes and output and consumption falls. As
time passes by, workers are matched with newly producing rms and the economy
5We restrict our attention to these two dimensions of LMR since they are widely considered
among the major contributors to the rigidity of continental European labor markets. See for
instance Bentolila and Bertola (1990), Yashiv (2004), Layard et al. (2005) and Ljungqvist and
Sargent (2006).
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recovers. When we compare partial and global reforms we nd that the latter would
amplify overall welfare gains even if the costs of transition would be larger. By
the same token, the timing of reforms matter. Our results suggest that gradualism
would enhance welfare: transition costs of a joint deregulation of product and labor
markets are larger compared to sequential reforms.
Second, PMR and LMR are interdependent. Gains from deregulation in a given
market are larger when the other market is more regulated to begin with. To un-
derstand the result consider for example the case in which LMR is reduced after
PMR has been already relaxed. The initial product market deregulation has trig-
gered variations in labor market conditions since producers entry has increased job
creation and reduced job destruction. The marginal gains from relaxing LMR be-
come smaller in terms of output and employment as labor market tightness is already
high to begin with: a reform in product market acts as a substitute for labor market
deregulation.6
Third, we show that changes in regulation can also have sizable e¤ects on the
business cycle properties of the economy. Lower barriers to entry and lower replace-
ment rates tend to smooth out aggregate uctuations while lower ring costs have
a reverse e¤ect. We nd that a "fully exible" Euro Area would adjust di¤erently
to aggregate shocks. The economy would experience a larger response on impact
and a quicker reversion to its steady state level. To gain some intuition consider
the e¤ects of a negative, temporary, productivity shock. In the rigid Euro Area the
drop in productivity is mainly propagated through the slower initial response of the
labor market: employment falls moderately due to the presence of higher ring costs
and aggregate demand and output do not drop abruptly. At the same time, higher
barriers to entry and higher unemployment benets negatively a¤ect the incentives
6On the other hand, deregulation in the labor market alters the incentives to enter the mar-
ket since the expected costs of creating and destroying jobs are key determinants of the present
discounted value of entry.
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to create new rms and jobs, contributing to a sluggish recovery. Conversely, in a
exible scenario downsizing is cheaper for incumbents and the initial drop in em-
ployment and output is more severe. At the same though, the recovery toward the
steady state would be quicker because of the smaller costs of creating rms and jobs.
Strict regulation might increase economic resilience to shocks in the Euro Area and
concerns about the speed of recover from downturns could be well placed.7
With respect to existing studies our work makes three important contributions.
First, we investigate the overall consequences of deregulation with a tractable but
full blown DSGE model able to capture both long and short to medium run e¤ects
of policy reforms. Second, we study how the timing of reforms can a¤ect macro-
economic outcomes. Third, we characterize the interdependence between PMR and
LMR, showing that the e¤ects of deregulation cannot be fully understood if reforms
are analyzed in isolation.
Previous work has followed two main routes. A rst group of studies focus on
the long run e¤ect of reforms, abstracting from the implications for the business cy-
cle. Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) develop a static model to highlight the channel
through which PMR and LMR can a¤ect labor market outcomes, focusing on the
political economy aspects of reforms. Ebell and Haefke (2009) extend their work to
quantitatively assess whether product market deregulation can explain the observed
reduction in the U.S. trend unemployment. Koeniger and Prat (2007) analyze the
impact of deregulation on rm selection using a static model with heterogenous
rms.8 Forni et al (forthcoming) and Pesenti and Laxton (2004) consider the dy-
namic adjustment to reforms abstracting from the role of rm dynamics and search
and matching frictions.
7This is consistent with Balakrishnan and Michelacci (2001), which document with a VAR
analysis that labor markets in some countries of the Euro Area might be dynamically sclerotic. See
also the empirical evidence provided by Duval, Elmeskov, and Vogel (2007).
8For brevity, we omit from our literature review a large body of theorethical work linking labor
market institutions and unemployment outcomes. See Blanchard (2006) and references therein for
an overview.
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A second group of studies has investigated the impact of labor market regulation
on business cycle dynamics, abstracting from the role of PMR and its interplay with
labor market reforms.9 Veracierto (2008), considers a real business cycle model with
establishment level dynamics but no search and matching frictions to analyze the
e¤ects of ring taxes on business cycle uctuations. Christo¤el, Kuester, and Linzert
(2009) focus on the role of labor market exibility for the transmission of monetary
policy in the Euro Area, while Campolmi and Faia (2006) and Thomas and Zanetti
(2008) study the e¤ects of labor market regulation on ination volatility.
A notable exception is Zanetti (2009) who considers the separate role of PMR
and LMR for output and ination dynamics. Di¤erently from us, he assumes a
constant number of producers in the economy, interpreting PMR as an increase
of the elasticity of substitution across goods. Furthermore, he doesnt address the
interdependence between product and labor markets reforms.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 we present the model.
Section 3 discusses the calibration. Section 4 discusses steady state and dynamics
e¤ects of deregulation. Section 5 focuses on business cycle implications of PMR and
LMR. Section 6 concludes.
1.2 The Model
1.2.1 Household Preferences
The economy is populated by a unit mass of atomistic households. All contracts
and prices are written in nominal terms and prices are exible.10 Each household
is taught of as a large extended family containing a continuum of members along a
9 In the paper we do not consider the role of nominal rigidities. We do so since our main goal is
to study the joint e¤ects of PMR and LMR on economic activity, abstracting from their interaction
with other sources of rigidity. Cacciatore and Fiori (in progress) extend the present framework in
this direction.
10For this reason we do not model demand for currency and resort to a cashless economy as in
Woodford (2003).
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unit interval. In equilibrium some members will be unemployed while some others
will be producing. Members in each family perfectly ensures each other against
variation in labor income due to employment or unemployment. There is no ex post
heterogeneity across individuals.
The representative household maximizes the following utility function:
u(C) = Et
( 1X
s=t
s t
C1 s
1  
)
; (1.1)
where C represents a basket of goods dened over a continuum 
: At any given
point in time only a subset of goods 
t 2 
 is available. Let pt(!) be the nominal
price for the good ! 2 
t: In order to account for the e¤ects on the competitive
environment introduced by product market regulation we depart from the standard
CES specication for the consumers preferences. Instead, we make use of the
translog expenditure function proposed by Feenstra (2003), which implies that mark
ups inversely depend on the number of existing goods in the economy Nt:11 The unit
expenditure function is dened as:
lnPt =
1
2
(
1
Nt
  1
~N
)+
1
Nt
Z
!2
t
ln pt(!)d!+

2Nt
Z
!2
t
Z
!02
t
ln pt(!)(ln pt(!) ln ln pt(!0))d!d!0:
where Pt is also the welfare based aggregate price index and Nt is the total
number of products available for consumption at time t: ~N corresponds to the mass
of 
:
1.2.2 Firms and Labor Market
There is a continuum of monopolistically competitive rms, each producing a dif-
ferent variety !. Production requires only labor and its characterized by constant
returns to scale. We model labor market frictions within the context of a large rm
11As Nt increases the demand elasticity increases, reducing markups:
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set up, in order to allow product and labor market regulation to a¤ect both size
and number of producing rms. Each rm employs a continuum of workers. The
stock of labor varies because of the endogenous variation in the hiring (job creation)
and separation (job destruction) rates. To hire a new worker rms have to post a
vacancy incurring in a xed cost  - expressed in units of the aggregate consump-
tion basket Ct. The probability of nding a worker depends on a constant return
to scale matching technology, which converts aggregate unemployed workers Ut and
aggregate vacancies Vt into aggregate matches Mt:
M(Ut; Vt) = U
"
t V
1 "
t ; 0 < " < 1:
Dening labor market tightness as t  VtUt , each rm meets unemployed workers
at a rate q(t) =
M(Ut;Vt)
Vt
: As in Krause and Lubik (2007), we assume that newly
created matches become productive only in the next period. For an individual rm,
the inow of new hires in t+1 is therefore q(t)vt(!); where vt(!) is the number of
vacancies posted by an incumbent !.
Firms and workers can separate for exogenous and endogenous motives. When
the rm nds a match to be no longer protable, it can dismiss the worker but it
has to incur a ring tax F , constant and proportional to the steady state wage:
F =  Fw
SS .12
Each lled job produces Ztzit units of output, where i indexes a particular job.
Production is subject to both aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks. Aggregate pro-
ductivity Zt is common to all rms, while a specic jobs productivity zit is idiosyn-
cratic. Job-specic productivity is an i:i:d: draw from a time invariant distribution
with cdf G(z), positive support and density g(z).13
12Firing costs in this model take the form of a pure ring tax. Severance transfers from the
rm to the worker have no allocative e¤ects with Nash wage bargaining, see e.g. Mortensen and
Pissarides (1994).
13As common in the literature, the i:i:d: assumption is for analytical tractability. A more realistic
assumption would be to allow the idiosyncratic shocks to display persistance. We conjecture that
8
Total output of the ! producer is determined by the measure lt(!) of jobs,
aggregate productivity Zt and an average of idiosyncratic job-specic shocks, zt.
yt(!) = Zt
1Z
zc(!)
z
dG(z)
1 G(zc) lt(!)  Ztzt(!)lt(!); (1.2)
where zc(!) is the (endogenous) critical threshold below which rms ! destroys
non protable jobs with zit(!) < zc(!). This result in an endogenous job destruction
rate G(zct (!)):
Total within rm separation is given by %ft (!) = %+ (1  %)G(zct (!)), where % is
the fraction of jobs that are exogenously separated at the beginning of each period,
identical across rms.14
The law of motion of employment for the producer ! is given by :
lt(!) = (1  %ft (!))(lt 1(!) + q(t 1)vt 1(!)) (1.3)
Endogenous entry of producers is modelled as in Bilbiie, Ghironi, and Melitz
(2007). Prior to entry, rms face an entry cost fE;t , to be specied later on. There
are no xed costs of production. Hence, all rms that enter the economy produce
every period until they are hit by a "death" shock, which occurs with probability
 2 (0; 1) in every period (it follows that exit of rms is exogenous in this model).15
When a rm leaves the market, its entire stock of workers becomes unemployed,
joining the pool of searchers in the next period. We assume that exiting rms bear
no costs associated with the workerslayo¤.
The timing of the model is as follows. At the beginning of time t :(i) aggre-
by departing from this assumption our results would not be signicantly a¤ected (see den Haan,
Ramey, and Watson (2000)).
14This assumption ensures that, in presence of small aggregate shocks, there are no corner solution
with zero hiring in the rms maximization problem.
15We abstract from the endogenous decision of rms to leave the market to preserve model
tractability.
9
gate productivity shock Zt and idiosyncratic job specic shocks zi(!) are realized;
(ii) entry decision by potential entrants is made; (iii) a fraction % of jobs are (ex-
ogenously) destroyed; (iv) incumbents endogenously destroy matches that became
unprotable; (v) all separated workers look for jobs and both new entrants and in-
cumbent rms post vacancies; (vi) new matches are created (productive in the next
period); (vii) individual wages are bargained between rms and producing workers;
(viii) production takes place and (ix), at the very end of period t, a fraction  of all
the existing rms exogenously leave the market.
Incumbent Firms
We start by describing the problem faced by a rm producing at time t. The
incumbent ! minimizes the following cost function:
Costt(!) = Et
1X
s=t
s t(1  )s t(s+1
s
)f ws(!)ls(!) + kvs(!) +G(zct (!))Fg;
subject to (2.3) and (2.2).16 The rst term of the cost function reects the
wage bill of the rm. Wages are not identical across workers , but depend on
the idiosyncratic productivity of the jobs. Therefore, ws(!) is an aggregate of the
individual wages paid by the incumbent !, taken as given by the producer. The
second terms reects vacancy costs and the third one corresponds to ring costs.
The rst-order necessary conditions are:
lt(!) : t(!) = wt(!)  't(!)Ztzt(!) + Ett;t+1(t+1(!)(1  %ft+1(!)); (1.4)
vt(!) :

q(t)
= Ett;t+1(t+1(!)(1  %ft+1(!)) +G(zct (!))F ); (1.5)
16Notice that each producer discount future expected costs taking into account the positive
probability of exit in each period.
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zct (!) : 't(!)Ztz
c
t (!) = w
c
t (!) 

qt
  F; (1.6)
where t;t+1 = (1  )(Ct+1Ct )  is the stochastic discount factor adjusted for the
exogenous exit probability and t and 't are the Lagrange multipliers attached to
the employment and output constraints, respectively. The multiplier t gives the
current period average value of workers for the incumbent !. The multiplier 't is
the contribution of an additional unit of output to the rms revenue and its equal
to the rms real marginal cost.
Each incumbent, due to the translog expenditure function, faces the following
demand schedule:
yDt (!) =  ln(
ept
pt(!)| {z }
mkt share
)Yt (1.7)
where ln ept = 1Nt + 1Nt Z
!2
t
ln pt(!)d! is the maximum price that a producer can
charge to have a positive market share and Yt is the aggregate demand - expressed
in units of the consumption basket Ct. Dene t(!) =
pt(!)
Pt
as the relative price
of a variety !. The rm maximizes the present discounted value of the stream of
current and future real prots:
t(!) = Et
1X
s=t
s t(1  )s t(t+s
t
)(t   't(!))yDt (!);
subject to (1.7). This yields:
t(!) = (Nt)'t(!);
where (Nt) =
t(!)
t(!) 1 is the endogenous mark up and t(!) =
d ln yDt
d ln t(!)
is the
elasticity of substitution faced by the incumbent !.
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1.2.3 Wage Setting
The wage schedule is obtained through the solution of an individual Nash bargaining
process. The bargain solution splits the surplus of the match over the rms and the
workers outside option. The analytical derivation of the wage scheduled is presented
in Appendix, here we report the equilibrium wage resulting from the bargaining
between a worker with a generic idiosyncratic productivity z and a producer !:
wzt (!) = ('t(!)Ztz + t   Ett;t+1(!)F ) + (1  )B; (1.8)
where t;t+1(!)= (1  pt)Ett;t+1%ft+1(!) and B is the unemployment benet
received by the worker if unemployed. We assume that B = hP + R w
SS , where the
rst term is home production and the second term corresponds to a transfer from
the government ( R is the replacement rate).
The wage rate is increasing in labor market tightness, real marginal cost, aggre-
gate and job specic productivity, while its lower the higher the expected probability
of ring the worker in the next period. The aggregate real wage is the average of the
individual wages, weighted according to the distribution of idiosyncratic productiv-
ity:
ws(!) =
1Z
zc(!)
w(z)
dG(z)
1 G(zc) : (1.9)
The labor market structure of our economy can be summarized by a job creation
equation, a job destruction equation and the expression for the aggregate wage rate
(1.9). Combining (1.4) and (1.5) we get the following job creation condition:

q(t)
= Ett;t+1(1  %ft+1(!))['t+1(!)Zt+1zt+1(!)  wt+1(!) +

q(t+1)
]; (1.10)
stating that the expected cost of posting a vacancy today - q(t) - has to be equal
to the expected marginal benet. Evaluating the expression (1.8) at the cut o¤
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productivity zct (!) and using eq. (1.6), we can restate the job destruction equation
as:
't(!)Zta
c
t = [B +
1
1   (t  

q(t)
  (1 + t;t+1)F ]: (1.11)
This equation denes the cuto¤ productivity zct , a su¢ cient statistics for the
behavior of job destruction. At the margin, the producer has to be indi¤erent
between maintaining the match and ring the worker.
1.2.4 Symmetric Equilibrium
In Appendix B we show that in equilibrium all the incumbents are identical regard-
less their timing of entry. In particular, we show that the reservation productivity
cuto¤ zct and the real marginal cost 't depend only on aggregate outcomes and hence
are identical across all producers. As a consequences all prices and quantities are
symmetric across rms:17 lt(!) = lt, zt(!) = zt, wt(!) = wt, t(!) = t, et(!) = et.
Exploiting the symmetry across producers we can obtain a closed form solution for
the elasticity of substitution across varieties t(!) = t = 1 +

Nt
: This provides an
expression for the endogenous mark up (Nt) = 1 + 1Nt :
18 Finally, by imposing
symmetry on the aggregate welfare based price index Pt, the relative price of each
variety can be written as:
t = e
  ~N Nt
2 ~NNt :
An increase in the number of rms implies that the relative price of each good t
increases. When there are more rms household derives more welfare from spending
a given nominal amount, i.e. the price index Pt decreases.
17Firms with an identical marginal cost will charge the same relative price, facing the same
demand schedule. Hence all the incumbents will produce the same amount. Recall that rms
output is given by Ztztlt. Once we have proved that zct is identical across all rms, then all rms
on the market will have the same stock of labor lt:
18As expected, as the number of producers Nt increases the mark up decreases.
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1.2.5 Firm Entry and Exit
The entry-exit decision is modelled as in Ghironi and Melitz (2005) and Bilbiie,
Ghironi, and Melitz (2007). In every period there is a mass Nt of rms producing
in the economy and an unbounded mass of perspective entrants. These entrants
are forward looking and correctly anticipate their future prots ds(!) in any period
s > t as well as the exogenous probability  of incurring in the exit-inducing shock:
Entrants at time t will start producing only from t+ 1.
An important aspect of the model is the way new entrants build their stock of
labor in order to be able to start production. Given the timing of labor market,
entrants have to post vacancies in t in order to begin production in t + 1. In
Appendix B we show that if all the producing rm are symmetric then the optimal
hiring policy for a new entrant is to post vacancies to exactly match the size of
incumbents.19 This is an important result since it ensures that the model features
a unique representative rm, as all the producers in each period are symmetric. We
dont need to keep track of di¤erent cohorts of rms entering the market at di¤erent
points in time.
Perspective entrants compute their expected post-entry value et(!) given by the
presented discounted value of the expected stream of per period prots ds:
et = Et
1
s=ts;s+1ds: (1.12)
Prior to entry, rms face a sunk entry cost fE;t to be paid in order to serve the
market. Its made by two components:
fE;t = fR;t +

q(#t)
lt
1  %ft
:
19This follows after proving that all the producers have the same marginal cost in each period t
regardless their timing of entry.
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The rst term fR;t represents the cost associated with regulation and barriers to
entry, exogenous and subject to shocks.20 It is expressed in units of the aggregate
consumption basket Ct: to pay for the regulation costs each rm has to purchase a
basket of materials which has the same composition as the consumption basket.21
The second component of fE;t reects instead the cost of recruiting workers to begin
production. Its endogenous and responds to aggregate labor market conditions. In
particular, its procyclical: as the labor market is tighter (higher #t and hence higher

q(#t)
- the expected cost of lling a vacancy) - ceteris paribus - entry is more costly
due to a congestion externality generated by the presence of search and matching
frictions in the labor market.
Entry occurs until rm value is equalized to the entry cost, leading to the free
entry condition et = fE;t.22 Given the time to build assumption, the law of motion
of rms is given by Nt = (1   )(Nt 1 + NE;t 1). The number of producing rms
represents the stock of capital of the economy. It behaves much like physical capital
in a standard RBC model, but it has an endogenously uctuating price given by
(2.15).
1.2.6 Household Budget Constraint and First Stage Budgeting
The representative household can invest in two types of assets: shares in a mutual
fund of rms23 and risk-free bonds. Let xt be the share in the mutual fund of
rms held by the representative household entering period t. The representative
household buys xt+1 shares in a mutual fund of all the rms existing at time t -
20Below we proxy product market deregulation as a permanent decrease in fR;t :
21We assume that the sunk regulation cost is paid in units of consumption for simplicity. An
alternative would be to assume that fR;t is denominated in units of labor, as in Ghironi and Melitz
(2005) and Bilbiie, Ghironi, and Melitz (2007). Assuming that workers can be employed either in
production of nal goods or in the entry sector would complicate the model due to the presence of
labor market frictions without a¤ecting our main results.
22This condition holds as long as the mass of new entrants NE;t is positive. We assume that
macroeconomic shocks are small enough for this condition to hold in each period.
23New entrants nance entry on the stock market in this model.
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Nt +NE;t - even though only a fraction (1  ) of those will be producing in t+ 1.
The price of one share at time t is equal to the price of claims to future rms real
prots et. The per period households budget constraint can be written as:
Bt+1+Ct+et(Nt+NE;t)xt+1 = (1+rt)Bt+(dt+et)Ntxt+ wtLt+B(1 Lt)+Tt; (1.13)
where rt is the real interest rate on bond holdings (known with certainty as
of t   1), B(1   Lt) represents the total amount of unemployment benets and Tt
are lump sum taxes. The household maximizes (2.1) subject to (2.17). The Euler
equations for bond and share holdings are respectively:
1 = (1 + rt)Et(
Ct+1
Ct
)  and et = (1  )Et(Ct+1
Ct
) (dt+1 + et+1):
1.2.7 Equilibrium
We are now able to characterize the equilibrium of our model economy. First, we
derive aggregate variables in the labor market. Since new entrants optimally choose
to have the same size of existing rms and all producers destroy the same share
of jobs zct , aggregate employment can be expressed as Lt = Ntlt. Total vacancies
Vt are the sum of the vacancies posted by producing rms V It and the vacancies
posted by new entrants V Et = NE;t
lt
q(t)
=
NE;t
Nt
Lt
q(t)
. The law of motion of aggregate
employment24 can be written as:
Lt = (1  %ft )(1  )| {z }
1 %Tt
(Lt 1 + q(t 1)Vt 1);
where %Tt is the economy wide total separation rate, reecting both within and
across rm job destruction. Accordingly, searching workers in period t are equal to
the the currently stock of unemployed workers: Ut = (1 Lt). Gross job destruction,
24Lt represents the total number of workers which are producing at time t.
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jdt, is equal to %Tt Lt   %Ltq(t); gross job creation, jct, is Vtq(t)   %Ltq(t): The
second term in each expression is subtracted because it represents exogenous worker
turnover. Total output produced by rms is used for consumption Ct, to pay for
the regulation component of the entry cost fR;t, and to create vacancies Vt :
Yt = Ct +NE;tfR;t + Vt:
The aggregate resource constraint for the economy can be obtained by imposing
the equilibrium conditions Bt = Bt+1 = 0, xt = xt+1 = 1 and B(1 Lt) = Tt in the
budget constraint (2.17). We get:
Ct +NE;tet = Ntdt + wtLt:
Total consumption plus investment has to be equal to total income (labor income
plus dividends).
The model features 25 endogenous variables: t;t+1, t;t+1, Lt, Ut, Vt, V
E
t , V
I
t ,
Mt, zct , %t, t, q(t), p(t), wt, 't, t, rt, (Nt), Nt, NE;t, dt, et, Yt, Ct fE;t. The
corresponding 25 equations are summarized in Table 1.
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TABLE 1: MODEL SUMMARY
Adjusted Discount Factor t;t+1 = (1  )(Ct+1Ct ) 
Firing Cost Discount Factor t;t+1= (1  pt)Ett;t+1%ft+1
Within Firm Separation %ft=%+(1 %)G(zct)
Aggregate Employment Lt= (1  %ft )(1  )(Lt 1+q(t 1)V t 1)
Aggregate Unemployment Ut= (1  Lt)
Entrants Vacancies V Et =
NE;t
Nt
Lt
q(t)
Aggregate Vacancies Vt= V
I
t+V
E
t
Matching Function M(U t; V t) = U
"
tV
1 "
t
Tightness t=
Vt
Ut
Job Finding rate p(t) =
M(Ut;Vt)
Ut
Vacancy Filling Rate q(t) =
M(Ut;Vt)
Vt
Aggregate Wage wt= ('tZtzt+1+t t;t+1F ) + (1  )B
Job Creation q(t)= Ett;t+1(1  %
f
t+1)['t+1Zt+1zt+1  wt+1+ q(t+1) ];
Job Destruction 'tZtz
c
t= [B+
1
1  (t  q(t) (1 + t;t+1)F ]
Mark Up (N t) = 1+
1
Nt
Pricing t= (N t)'t
Variety E¤ect t= e
  ~N Nt
2 ~NNt
Prots dt= (1  1(Nt)) YtNt
Entry Cost fE;t = fR;t +

q(#t)
lt
1 %ft
:
Free Entry et= fE;t
Number of Firms Nt= (1  )(N t 1+NE;t 1)
Euler equation (bonds) 1 = (1 + rt)Et(
Ct+1
Ct
) 
Euler equation (shares) et= (1  )Et(Ct+1Ct ) (dt+1+et+1)
Aggregate Output Yt= Ct+NE;tfR;t+V t:
Aggregate Accounting Ct+NE;tet= N tdt+ wtLt:
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1.3 Calibration
We interpret periods as quarters and calibrate the model to the Euro Area as of
the end of 2007.25 All Euro Area wide data are taken from the Area-Wide-Model
database. We employ only quarterly data from 1997Q1 to 2007Q4 for the calibration.
We do so since the index we employ for PMR is available for the year 1997. For this
reason we set 1997 as the beginning of our sample.26
We set the discount factor  = :99 implying an annual real interest rate of 4%.
The value of the risk aversion coe¢ cient  is equal to 1, while  is chosen to produce
a steady state markup of 10%. The implied steady state elasticity of demand -  -
is equal to 11.27
Pissarides (2003) compiles an index for entry delay as the number of business
days that it takes (on average) to fulll entry requirements, weighted by the number
of procedures that must be performed. The entry delay index is reported in Table
3. We take the average value of the index across countries as a proxy for the Euro-
Area. We follow the procedure proposed by Ebell and Haefke (2009) to convert
this index in months of lost output to get a value of fR: The average value of the
regulation index for the Euro area is 50:9 (days required to fulll entry requirements)
corresponding to 0:85 quarters of lost output (based on 220 business days in a year).
Pissarides reports 8:5 days for United States. The implied value of fR is 0:15:
Turning to the labor market we set the elasticity of the matching function " = :6,
a value consistent with the survey of estimates of the matching function for European
countries reported by Pissarides (2003), ranging from " = 0:5 to " = 0:7. We select
a mid point of these estimates.28
In order to calibrate the exogenous within rm separation - % - and the exogenous
25The countries member at that time were: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain.
26We also recalibrated our model using a longer period of time, 1984 - 2007, in order to avoid
possible concerns about the relatively short duration of the sample (44 observations). Our results
are virtually unchanged and available upon request.
27 In steady state - imposing the symmetric equilibrium - the elasticity of demand is given by
 = 1 +NSS:
28This value is also consistent with recent evidence reported by Fahr and Sunde (2002) for
Germany.
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exit of plants -  - we target the portion of job destruction due to the exit of
plants and the ratio between job destruction and employment observed in the data.
Empirical evidence suggests that job destruction - jdSS - induced by the exit of
plants ranges between 25 to 55 percents in countries belonging to the Euro area.
At the same time job destruction ows range from 2.1% to 4.3% as reported by
Gomez-Salvador, Messina, and Vallanti (2004). We set % and  so that the exit of
plants accounts for 40% of overall job destruction and the ratio jdSS=LSS is equal
to 2,5%: Appendix D describes our procedure in detail.
The replacement rate is  R = 0:68, an average of values reported in Table 3
taken from the OECD (2004) "Benets and Wages" publication. The value for
United States is :54. Given F =  Fw
SS , we follow Thomas and Zanetti (2008) and
set  F = :2:
In absence of empirical guidance, the bargaining power of workers is set to a
conventional value of  = :5.
Three labor market parameters are left to calibration. The cost of posting a
vacancy , the ow value of home production hP , the e¢ ciency of the matching
function . As common practice in the literature, we choose , hP and  in order to
match the steady state unemployment rate USS , the probability of lling a vacancy
qSS and the total separation rate %T . We set USS = 9:3% which is computed from
quarterly data on unemployment. Total separation %T is set to 3%. This values is an
average of values reported for the Euro Area - see Christo¤el, Kuester, and Linzert
(2009) for a thoughtful discussion. Finally, we set qSS = 0:7, a value in line with
estimates reported by ECB (2002) and Weber (2000).
The idiosyncratic productivity shock z is lognormally distributed with mean 
and standard deviation A: The parametrization of the latter follows den Haan,
Ramey, and Watson (2000): we normalize  to 0, calibrating A to match the
relative volatility of unemployment with respect to GDP.
The persistence of the AR(1) technology shock Zt is set to 0:64; as in Christo¤el,
Kuester, and Linzert (2009). The standard deviation of the technology innovation is
chosen to reproduce the volatility of GDP observed in the data. Table 2 summarize
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our benchmark calibration.
TABLE 2: CALIBRATION SUMMARY
Parameter Value Source/Target
Variety Elasticity % = 1:898  = 10%
Discount Factor  = :99 r = 4%
Regulation Cost fR = :85 Data
Plant Exit  = :0125 JD
EXIT
jd = :4
Exogenous separation % = :0072 JDL = :025
Replacement Rate  R = :68w
SS Data
Firing Costs  F = :2w
SS Lit
Elasticity Matching Function  = :6 Lit
Workers Bargaining Power  = :5 Lit
Home Production hp :301 USS = 9:3%
Matching E¢ ciency  = :421 qSS = :7
Vacancy Cost k = :068 %Tot = :03
Std Idiosyncratic Shock A = :38 U=Y
Std Aggregate Shock Z = :0077 Y
Persistence Aggregate Shock %Z = :64 Data
1.4 Dynamic Adjustment and Long Run E¤ects of Deregulation
We now investigate the consequences of structural reforms for the Euro Area. First
we characterize the theoretical link between product and labor market reforms from
a theoretical point of view. Then we study the dynamic adjustment and the new
long run equilibrium following deregulation.
1.4.1 Inspecting the Mechanism
To simplify the analysis, we abstract from the presence of aggregate uncertainty
and focus on steady state relationships.29 Consider the expression for the long run
29 In Appendix B we illustrate how to compute the steady state of the model.
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unemployment rate:
U = (o +1G(z
c))| {z }
Job ows
1 "| {z }
Unemp. Duration
where o and 1 are two constants30 and the two terms in which we decompose
U have an economic interpretation. The rst term reects the steady state job
ows and its summarized by the behavior of the reservation productivity zc; the
second term expresses unemployment duration as function of labor market tightness
. Unemployment is increasing in both terms.
The e¤ects of policy reforms on equilibrium unemployment depend on their
relative impact on  and zc, i.e. on the relative shifts of job creation (JC) and job
destruction (JD) curves. These two curves can be written as:
JC curve :


 " = (1  )(1  )((N(; zc)| {z }
Variety E¤ect
(z   zc)  F )
JD curve : zc =
1
(N(; zc)| {z }
Variety E¤ect
(

1     
 " +B + (1 + t;t+1)F );
where (N) = N(;z
c)
1+N(;zc)e
  ~N N(;zc)
2 ~NN(;zc) = (N)(N) and
@(N)
@N j(;zc) > 0.
With respect to the standard Mortensen and Pissarides model with a xed num-
ber of producers, there is an extra term appearing in both JC and JD curves, (N),
which we call "variety e¤ect". This term reects the fact that a given variation in
the competitive environment triggers a change in the equilibrium unemployment by
a¤ecting job ows and unemployment duration. To gain some intuition, observe
that as N increases the real marginal benet of a match increases (as  increases).
This in turn leads, ceteris paribus, to a decrease of the reservation productivity zc
since each existing match becomes more valuable to the rm. At the same time,
higher N , ceteris paribus, increases vacancy posting, making labor market tightness
 higher.
30Namely, o =  + (1  )x and 1 =  + (1  )(1  x).
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Lets now focus on the steady state free entry condition which pins down N :
e = fR +
l
q(1  %f ) ::
This equation shows that in equilibrium the price of investment (the value of
entry) is related to labor market tightness. Any change in labor market conditions
trigger variations in the cost of recruiting workers, a¤ecting protability of entry.
As a result, N itself depends on  and zc.
Our analysis reveals that PMR and LMR jointly determine structural unem-
ployment and the number of producers in the economy. As a result, in order to
understand the consequences of deregulation its impossible to abstract from the
interdependent nature of policy changes: the e¤ects of a given reform might depend
on the nature of other prevailing policies.
1.4.2 Deregulation in the Euro Area: Macroeconomic Adjustment
We now quantitatively study the e¤ects of deregulating product and labor market
in Europe. We focus on a one-time, permanent reduction of policy parameters31,
considering single policy changes - PMR and LMR are changed in isolation - and a
global reform - a joint deregulation of product and labor market. Product market
deregulation is modelled as a permanent decrease of regulatory barriers, fR, while
labor market deregulation is a permanent, joint, reduction of unemployment benets
and ring costs,  R and  F respectively.
32 We assume that policy parameters
are lowered to their corresponding U.S. levels, a standard benchmark of a exible
developed economy. As illustrated in Section 3, the mapping between the model
parameters and the data make the analysis transparent.
Our dynamic exercise reveals that deregulation can induce a trade o¤ between
31We consider a perfect foresight exercise assuming that no other aggregate shocks hits the
economy after the unexpected, permanent change in PMR or LMR. In the next section we turn to
the implication of regulation for business cycles uctuations.
32We model a change in LMR as a simultaneous reduction of ring costs and unemployment
benets. We do so since it turns out that the timing of reforms in the labor market is irrelevant. In
an Appendix available upon request we discuss the e¤ects of deregulating unemployment benets
and ring costs in isolation and we explain the irrelevance of the timing of reforms.
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short and long run outcomes. Figure 3 shows the e¤ects of a decrease in barriers
to entry. The presence of short run costs is evident. In the aftermath of the reform
aggregate consumption drops since entry of new producers needs to be nanced
by households who need to save more. The number of entrants overshoots the
new steady state level since the expected value of entry is higher on impact when
competition is lower to begin with. Entry of new rms boosts job creation. At
the same time, incumbents anticipate the future reduction in their market shares
and begin to downsize by destroying unproductive matches. The reallocation of
workers from incumbents to new entrants leave the unemployment rate unchanged
initially. As the number of rms in the market grows, markups drops, GDP rises and
consumption recovers. The fraction of jobs endogenously destroyed is reduced over
time, as the value of a continuing match increases due to the congestion externality
in the labor market.
Figure 4 plots the dynamic adjustment to a labor market reform, a permanent
decrease in  R and  F . Labor market deregulation presents a di¤erent intertem-
poral trade-o¤ with respect to a change in PMR. In the aftermath of the reform
employment is negatively a¤ected but aggregate consumption is not reduced. The
spike in unemployment occurs since initially job destruction responds more than
job creation. Lower ring costs reduce the protability of low productive matches
increasing job destruction. At the same time, lower ring costs and unemployment
benets boost job creation - workersoutside option deteriorates and the expected
costs of terminating a match lowers. The di¤erent behavior between job creation
and destruction is due to the fact that while destroying existing jobs is an instanta-
neous process, matching rms and workers takes times. Remarkably, consumption
doesnt fall on impact despite the spike in unemployment. Beyond the result there
is a standard consumption smoothing motive: households reduce savings since they
anticipate the permanent future increase in income due ti higher long run employ-
ment and wages.
Labor market deregulation does not trigger large rm dynamics compared to
product market reforms. Even if the long run e¤ect on unemployment is similar,
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the adjustment takes place along the intensive margin. This happens because a
exible labor market boosts the incumbents incentives to expand production by
increasing the stock of labor. Larger incumbent and congestion externalities make
the expected costs of entry larger - the xed entry cost increases - compressing the
variations along the extensive margin. In a sense, incumbents have a competitive
advantage with respect to potential entrants since they do not have to incur in the
sunk cost in order to benet from the labor market reform.
Figure 6 displays the dynamic adjustment to a global reform. An overall reduc-
tion of barriers to entry, ring costs and unemployment benets would be benecial
in terms of long run consumption and unemployment. At the same time though,
such a reform would induce signicant adjustment costs in terms of employment and
consumption. The impulse responses highlights that PMR and LMR have impor-
tant interactive e¤ects. The temporary drop in consumption and unemployment is
much larger than what observed under single reforms, indicating that the e¤ects of
reforms are non purely additive. The key to understand the result is the combined
e¤ect of relaxing barriers to entry and ring costs simultaneously. Entry of new pro-
ducers triggers substantial reallocation of workers from incumbents to new entrants.
The contemporary reduction of ring costs make downsizing incumbents to re even
more, contributing to the rise in unemployment. As these two e¤ects interact the
initial negative response of unemployment and consumption is magnied.33 As time
passes by the reallocation of workers is completed, aggregate demand recovers and
employment rises together with output and consumption.
1.5 Welfare and Interdependence of Reforms
After characterizing the adjustment to reforms and the new long run equilibrium
properties following deregulation we exploit the microfounded nature of our model
to measure the welfare consequences of reforms.34 Importantly, the dynamic nature
33Lowering entry and ring costs in isolation in fact triggers smaller e¤ects on unemployment on
impact.
34Our model features perfect risk sharing among family members and no ex post heterogeneity
between employed and unemployed workers. As a result our welfare calculations are meant to
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of our model allow us to account for the long run welfare e¤ects as well as costs of
the transition.
We report welfare calculations for di¤erent policy experiments. First, we contrast
the e¤ects of global and partial reforms. Then we address whether the timing of
reforms matters and, nally, we analyze the e¤ects of policy changes in a given
market conditioning on the level of regulation prevailing in the other.
To compute welfare changes we calculate the fraction of aggregate consumption
that would make the representative household indi¤erent between not implementing
the reform (consuming Crigid in each period) and deregulating (consuming Ct - time
varying until the economy reaches the new steady state):
1X
s=t
s t
[ Crigid(1 + )](1 )
1   =
1X
s=t
s t
[Ct]
(1 )
1   ; (1.14)
where  is the percentage increase of steady state consumption that would make
the household indi¤erent. We consider an overall deregulation of the Euro Area.
Table 4 shows that welfare e¤ects of deregulation are always positive. In absence
of policy changes, consumption should increase by 8:96% to make the household
indi¤erent between a rigid and fully exible regime. Single reforms are also bene-
cial but welfare gains are smaller compared to a global reform. This result is not
necessarily expected since transition costs are larger with full deregulation. Our
calculation reveals that long run gains make up for such larger adjustment costs. It
is important to point out that the costs of transition to a global reform are sizable
since pure steady state welfare gains would amount to almost 10.5%.
So far we have considered a quite radical type of global reform, assuming that
both product and labor markets are lowered at the same time. It is natural to
ask whether welfare e¤ects of deregulation depend on the timing of reforms: even
if the long run outcome is identical, transition costs could indeed be di¤erent. To
address this issue we compute the welfare e¤ects of other two types of global reforms
capture only aggregate implications of deregulation, while the presence of potentially important
distributional conicts cannot be addressed.
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that conceptually are the exact opposite with respect to the global reform we have
analyzed. Specically we assume that PMR is deregulated after LMR and vice-
versa. Table 4 reports results. The timing of reforms maters. The short-run welfare
costs are in fact lower when reforms are implemented sequentially. This is not
surprising since previous impulse responses already revealed that when reforms are
implemented jointly transition costs are larger. As a result, this seems to suggest
that gradualism might be a welfare improving strategy for deregulating Europe.
Finally, we study the presence of conditional e¤ects of reforms. Table 4 shows
that gains from deregulation in a given market are larger when the other market
is more regulated to begin with. To understand the result consider, for example,
the case in which LMR is reduced after PMR has been already relaxed. The initial
reform in product market triggers variations in labor market conditions since entry
tends to increase job creation and reduce job destruction. As a result, once product
markets are exible, the marginal gains from relaxing LMR become smaller in terms
of output and employment: a reform in product market acts as a substitute for
deregulation in the labor market. When PMR is relaxed starting from a situation in
which the labor market is already exible the e¤ects of the reform are also smaller.
Deregulation in the labor market alters the present discounted value of rm entry
by making the expected costs of creating and destroying jobs higher. As a result,
smaller barriers to entry increase the number of rms on the market but the net
e¤ect on job creation is quite modest since the labor market is already tight to begin
with.
1.6 The Impact of Deregulation on Business Cycle Fluctuations
So far we have characterized the direct implications of deregulation, i.e. the dynamic
adjustment of the economy to reforms and the new long run equilibrium. A second
important aspects to consider when studying the macroeconomic consequences of
deregulation involves the e¤ects of reforms on business cycle uctuations. Intuitively,
PMR and LMR a¤ect the decisions to enter the market as well as the incentives to
create and destroy jobs. As a result, the level of regulation might be important to
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understand the way a given economy adjusts to shocks.35
We proceed as follows. First, we show that the model is well suited for a business
cycle analysis since it successfully matches selected second moments of macroeco-
nomic aggregates of the Euro Area. Second, we study the impact of policy reforms
for the dynamic response of the economy, focusing on the implications of an overall
deregulation for business cycle dynamics in the Euro Area.
1.6.1 Benchmark Economy: Rigid Euro Area
Figure 7 describes the dynamic response of our benchmark economy to a 1% nega-
tive, persistent productivity shock. On impact, as Zt drops, the economy responds
along its intensive margin since the number of producing rms is predetermined.
Incumbents reduce production by (costly) increasing job destruction36, as the re-
duction in aggregate productivity reduces protability of existing matches. The un-
employment rate increases, while tightness falls together with the aggregate wage.
The number of new entrants decreases even if the entry cost is lower. This feeds
back into the labor market, further depressing job creation. Consumption and GDP
decrease.
Entry does not reach its negative pick on impact as it would happen in a model
without labor market frictions (see Bilbiie, Ghironi, and Melitz (2007)). Instead,
since it takes time to downsize the stock of labor, the drop in employment is slow
and production doesnt fall abruptly. Unemployment continues to rise after the rst
period, while GDP and entry of new rms drop.
The reduction in the number of producers increases markups and incumbents
market share. This e¤ect paired with the gradual recovery in aggregate productivity
Zt makes entry positive. Vacancy posting is now cheaper and incumbent rms start
to create new jobs. Less marginal jobs are destroyed. Wages, GDP and consumption
go back to their initial steady state level.
The variation in the number of plants and in the stock of workers are the key
35We assume that technology shocks are the only driver of business cycles uctuations.
36Given the timing of the model, this is the only margin they can use to shred workers on impact.
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endogenous state variables for the propagation of aggregate shocks in our model.
Labor market frictions, sunk entry costs and time to build introduce substantial
internal persistence. The producersentry decisions respond to labor market condi-
tions as the latter a¤ect both cost and protability of entry. The sluggish variation
in the number of producers feeds back into labor market outcomes, contributing to
the propagation of the shock.
Second Moments To evaluate the business cycle properties of our model, we
compute model-implied second moments for HP-ltered key macroeconomic vari-
ables and compare them to Euro Area data. The source of uctuations is an aggre-
gate productivity shock with persistence set at .64 (as in Christo¤el, Kuester, and
Linzert (2009)) and standard deviation of innovations equal to 0.0077 (chosen to
match the volatility of GDP observed in the data).
The moments in our model are calculated on real variables deated by a data
consistent price index - i.e. for any variable Xt in units of consumption, the data
consistent counterpart is obtained as Xtt :
37 Results are presented in Table 4.
Volatility of GDP and unemployment are matched by construction. The model
is able to reproduce the volatility of wages, while it understates volatility of con-
sumption.38 Even though data about vacancies and tightness are not available for
the Euro Area, our model generates values relative to GDP that are in the range
of those observed for Germany (see Christo¤el, Kuester, and Linzert (2009)). The
model is also able to generate a negative Beveridge curve and a negative correlation
between job creation and job destruction. We view this as a success, given the usual
di¢ culties of the standard search and matching framework along these dimensions.
Our setup is also quite successful in replicating the contemporaneous correlation
between output and the other macro variables. In particular, the model closely
matches the contemporaneous correlation between GDP and unemployment. The
endogenous persistence of variables, even if higher than a standard RBC model, is
37See Ghironi and Melitz (2005) for a comprehensive discussion.
38With respect to consumption, our model faces the same well-known di¢ culty of the standard
RBC model where consumption is too smooth relative to the data.
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still lower than the one observed in the data. The model is also able to generate
countercyclical markups and procyclical prots.
1.6.2 Business Cycles Implication of Deregulation
The last question we want to address is whether a global reform would a¤ect business
cycle dynamics in the Euro Area. That is, would a exible Euro Area respond
di¤erently to aggregate shocks?
From a theoretical point of view, deregulation in product and labor market
a¤ects business cycle dynamics through di¤erent channels. PMR impacts on the
response of the extensive margin to shocks. With a less stringent PMR, the economy
uctuates around a steady state with a larger number of rms of a smaller size,
smaller mark ups and higher employment.39 Amplitude and persistence of shocks
are reduced. The present discounted value of entry changes less in response to
disturbances, triggering smaller variations in the number of rms on the market.
The reduction in markups is dampened, further mitigating output and employment
dynamics (incumbents have less incentives to change their stock of labor).
The e¤ects of a change in LMR can have contrasting e¤ects for the propagation
of aggregate shocks, as already pointed out by Thomas and Zanetti (2008). The
result survives in a model with endogenous rm dynamics. On one hand job creation
tends to become less responsive to aggregate shocks in a exible labor market since a
lower replacement rate worsens workersoutside option: the real wage becomes more
responsive to shocks and ows in and out of employment become smaller. At the
same time though smaller ring costs increase the responsiveness of job destruction,
amplifying the e¤ects of aggregate shocks on labor market dynamics.
We nd that a "fully exible" Euro Area would adjust di¤erently to aggregate
shocks.40 The economy would experience larger response on impact and a quicker
reversion to its steady state level. To gain some intuition consider the e¤ects of
a negative, temporary, productivity shock. In the rigid Euro Area the drop in
39 Impulse responses are available upon request.
40Table 6 shows the e¤ects of single policy changes.
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productivity is mainly propagated through the slower initial response of the labor
market: employment falls moderately due to the presence of higher ring costs and
aggregate demand and output do not drop abruptly. At the same time, higher
barriers to entry and higher unemployment benets negatively a¤ect the incentives
to create new rms and jobs, contributing to a sluggish recovery.41 Conversely,
in a exible scenario downsizing is cheaper for incumbents and the initial drop
in employment and output is more severe. At the same though, the recovery to
the steady state would be much quicker due to the smaller costs of creating rms
and jobs. Our results point out that strict regulation might increase economic
resilience to shocks.42 Concerns about the negative e¤ects of product and labor
market regulation for the speed of recovery from downturns could be well placed.43
1.7 Conclusions
We have developed a model with endogenous producer entry and labor market
frictions to study the e¤ects of product and labor market regulation. Calibrating
our model to the Euro Area we have shown that reforming product and labor markets
would have important consequences for the overall behavior of the economy.
First, deregulation, either partial or global, would be welfare improving. At the
same time the transition following structural reforms could induce adjustment costs
in terms of consumption and unemployment. When we compare partial and global
reforms we nd that the latter would amplify overall welfare gains even if the costs of
transition would be larger. Second, PMR and LMR are interdependent. Gains from
deregulation in a given market are larger when the other market is more regulated
to begin with . This result points out that product and labor market deregulation
in Europe tends to be substitute. Finally, regulation matters for the business cycle
41Larger entry costs make entry less attractive other things equal since they require a larger
present discounted value of future prots to induce perspective entrants to pay the sunk entry
costs. Larger replacement rates instead would make the real wage to absorb less of the change in
productivity, discouraging entry and job creation in the aftermath of the shock.
42See the empirical evidence provided by Duval, Elmeskov, and Vogel (2007).
43This is consistent with Balakrishnan and Michelacci (2001), which document with a VAR
analysis that labor markets in some countries of the Euro Area might be dynamically sclerotic.
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properties of the economy. Lower barriers to entry and lower replacement rates
would tend to smooth out uctuations, while smaller ring costs would have a
reverse e¤ect. Overall the Euro Area would become more responsive to exogenous
disturbances but the absorption of shocks would be quicker.
There are issues related to the role of regulation that we didnt explore in this
paper that we consider important. First the model abstracts from the presence of
other relevant rigidities, namely price and wage rigidities. Since we believe to have
documented the importance of the interdependence of PMR and LMR for aggregate
outcomes we think that studying the joint e¤ect of PMR and LMR in the presence
of sticky prices/wages might be of interest for the conduct of monetary policy in the
Euro Area (see Cacciatore and Fiori (in progress)).
Second, in the model we assume no ex-post heterogeneity across agents and
hence distributional issue are left aside from our analysis. Relaxing the assumption
of perfect risk sharing might add a signicant piece of information about the e¤ects
of PMR and LMR from welfare perspective.
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Chapter 2
International Trade and Macroeconomic
Dynamics with Labor Market Frictions
2.1 Introduction
Do country-specic labor market frictions a¤ect the consequences of trade integra-
tion? Several empirical studies have documented substantial cross-country hetero-
geneity in labor market characteristics and its importance for aggregate outcomes.1
While theoretical contributions have analyzed the long run e¤ects of trade on unem-
ployment, little work has investigated how the functioning of labor markets a¤ects
overall outcomes of integration. This is the perspective adopted in this paper.
Specically, I study the dynamic consequences of trade integration on unemploy-
ment and economic activity and the business cycle implications of stronger trade
linkages between countries with potentially heterogeneous labor markets. In so do-
ing, I contribute to the trade literature, which typically focuses only on the long-run
e¤ects of trade integration and abstracts from its e¤ects on uctuations, and the in-
ternational macroeconomic literature, by exploring the role of labor market frictions
and trade in explaining international business cycle evidence.
To accomplish these goals, I develop a two-country, stochastic, general equi-
librium model of trade and macroeconomic dynamics with heterogeneous rms, en-
dogenous producer entry, and frictional labor markets. The model builds on Ghironi
1The World Bank (2007), following Botero et al. (2004), constructed a measure of the rigid-
ity of employment laws across countries. For example, the index for the U.S. is 97 (out of 100,
corresponding to maximum exibility), while for France, Italy and Germany it is 34, 45 and 50
respectively. Moreover, labor market characteristics are found to be signicant determinants of
unemployment rates (Nickell and Nunziata, 2005), job ows (Haltiwanger, 2008), and the cyclical
behavior of unemployment (Gomez, Vallanti and Messina, 2004, Messina and Vallanti , 2007).
and Melitz (2005) in its determination of trade along the dynamics of the economy:
Heterogeneous, monopolistically competitive rms face sunk entry costs in the do-
mestic market and both xed and per-unit export costs. Relatively more productive
rms export, while the remaining, less productive producers only serve the domestic
market.2 To introduce equilibrium unemployment and study the role of alternative
labor market structures, I assume the presence of search and matching frictions
as in Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), with costs of job creation and destruction
and unemployment benets that can di¤er across countries.3 Model tractability is
preserved since I show that appropriately dened average productivities summarize
all the relevant information for aggregate dynamics, as in the basic Melitz (2003)
model.
The combination of product and labor market dynamics explains observed re-
sponses to trade integration: reallocation of production toward most productive
rms (Treer, 2004, and Bernard et al., 2003) and within-industry job creation and
destruction (Levinsohn, 1999 and Haltiwanger et al. 2004).4 Heterogeneous labor
markets imply asymmetric e¤ects of global reductions of trade barriers, causing im-
portant di¤erences in the short-run e¤ects on unemployment across countries.5 In
the aftermath of integration, the economy with a more rigid labor market experi-
ences an increase in unemployment, since larger hiring and ring costs dampen the
reallocation of workers toward the most productive rms. In contrast, unemploy-
ment falls in the exible economy. In the long run unemployment is lower in both
economies, since the reallocation of market shares toward more productive produc-
2This paper focuses on within industry trade. The assumptions about the product market
structure are justied by overwhelming empirical evidence indicating substantial productivity dif-
ferentials across producers and the presence of barriers to entry into domestic and export markets.
3 In this framework key parameters of the labor market have a clear counterpart in the data. As a
result, the introduction of heterogeneity in labor markets across trading partners has a transparent
empirical ground.
4While empirical work documented the presence of labor reallocation in response to trade inte-
gration between plants and within sectors, reallocation of workers across industries is found to be
not signicant (see Wacziarg and Wallace, 2004).
5For calibration purposes, I assume that the more rigid economy in the model features labor
market characteristics similar to the Europes Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) - Euro Area
henceforth. The exible economy represents the U.S. Hiring and ring restrictions and generosity of
unemployment benets are considered among the major contributors to the rigidity of continental
European labor markets. See for instance Bentolila and Bertola (1998), Layard et al. (2005), and
Ljungqvist and Sargent (2006).
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ers increases the average return to a match in both countries. Thus, more workers
are matched to rms in the new steady state. Importantly, there is no trade-o¤
between short- and long-run unemployment outcomes in any country when labor
markets are symmetric.
While the short-run unemployment e¤ects of trade reforms di¤er (qualitatively
and quantitatively) across heterogeneous labor markets, consumption increases every-
where, and so does welfare both in the long run and along the transition. Favor-
able terms of trade boost consumption in the rigid country, while productivity and
employment gains more than o¤set a negative terms of trade e¤ect in the exible
trading partner. However, there are di¤erences in the size of consumption and wel-
fare gains across di¤erent labor markets: As employment and wages are higher, and
competition from abroad is lower, the exible economy becomes a relatively more
protable business environment, attracting more rms on the market. Thus, em-
ployment and consumption increase by more than in the rigid trading partner both
during the transition and in the new steady state. Welfare gains are larger (smaller)
the more rigid (exible) the trading partner is.
The trade literature usually restricts the analysis of the consequences of trade
integration to the long-run, directconsequences of the integration shock.6 How-
ever, trade integration a¤ects economic outcomes and welfare also through its e¤ects
on the domestic and international propagation of business cycle shocks. The dy-
namic, stochastic, general equilibrium model of this paper allows me to address
the full range of consequences of trade integration. In particular, the interaction
of product and labor market dynamics that determines the direct consequences of
trade integration is also at the heart of the propagation mechanism of business cycle
shocks. Aggregate productivity disturbances generate spikes in job creation and
destruction, with persistent e¤ects on employment as a consequence of matching
frictions. The protability of producer entry into domestic and export markets re-
sponds to aggregate labor market conditions, and the sluggish adjustment in the
6For instance, this is the approach of a recent paper by Helpman and Itskhoki (2008) that also
features labor market frictions.
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number of producers over time feeds back into employment dynamics that magnify
the future output e¤ects of shocks. In turn, amplication of domestic responses
implies that shocks originating in one country can trigger sizable and long lasting
e¤ects on its trading partner, increasing country interdependence.
In this context, structural di¤erences in labor markets translate into di¤erent
e¤ects of shocks on protability of job creation and destruction, resulting in di¤erent
entry and export dynamics across countries. Aggregate uctuations are dampened
in the more rigid economy, but output and unemployment display higher persistence,
consistent with the evidence in Michelacci and Balakhrishnan (2004) and Duval et
al. (2007).
Trade integration a¤ects this mechanism in two ways: When trade barriers are
reduced, the magnication of domestic shocks induced by sunk entry costs and
search and matching frictions translates into larger and more persistent e¤ects on
foreign output dynamics, with a positive e¤ect on the comovement of business cycles
across countries. Moreover, since the endogenous response of domestic and export
market entry mitigates the terms of trade e¤ects of shocks, the incentives to shift
resources across countries over the cycle are dampened, with a further positive
e¤ect on comovement. Thus, the model predicts that business cycle synchronization
increases with stronger trade linkages, as reported by Frankel and Rose (1998) and
Clark and van Wincoop (2001). This result has often eluded standard international
business cycle models that typically predict too small or negative e¤ects of trade
integration on output comovement the so called trade-comovement puzzle (Kose
and Yi, 2005).7 Importantly, the mechanisms leading to increased synchronization
do not depend on country-specic labor market features. Essential for the result is
the endogenous interaction between product and labor market dynamics: the time
consuming nature of the matching process combines with the presence of sunk entry
7 In standard international RBC models, larger trade costs i.e. weaker trade linkages increase
output correlation by reducing the incentives to reallocate investment across countries in response to
shocks. As a result, the positive e¤ect of stronger demand linkages generated by lower trade barriers
is more than o¤set. Importantly, even under nancial autarky the predicted synchronization is less
than one fourth compared to the data: domestic shocks generate too small and short lasting e¤ects
on foreign output uctuations, despite the increase in product markets integration.
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costs, changing the propagation of shocks across countries with respect to standard
international RBC models. Nevertheless, as asymmetries in labor markets become
less pronounced, comovement is further strengthened.8
The consequences of trade integration on output volatility are instead conditional
on the labor market characteristics of trading partners. As comovement increases,
economic uctuations become larger in the economy with a more rigid labor market
and reduce in the exible one. When labor markets are more similar these e¤ects
are milder.
The trade paper that is most closely related to my exercise is Helpman and It-
skhoki (2008).9 As in that paper, I focus on the role of labor market imperfections for
the consequences of trade integration. Helpman and Itskhoki introduce search un-
employment in a static two-sector model of trade with heterogeneous rms to study
the e¤ects of labor market rigidities and trade impediments on long-run welfare,
trade ows, productivity, and unemployment. In contrast, I study the consequences
of heterogeneity in labor market structures for the e¤ects of trade integration from
the short to the long run, and I consider the full range of e¤ects of trade integration,
including its impact on business cycle dynamics.10
This paper is also related to a recent literature in international macroeconomics
that, starting with Ghironi and Melitz (2005), shows how models with richer trade
microfoundations than usually assumed can yield novel insights into macroeconomic
dynamics and contribute to explaining international business cycle evidence.11 I
contribute to this literature by showing that labor market frictions play an important
8This result has implications for the policy debates on economic integration and adoption of a
common currency in the EMU. Frankel and Rose (1998) argued that lack of business cycle syn-
chronization across countries should not necessarily be a concern when considering adoption of a
common currency because the trade expansion from reduced trade frictions would result endoge-
nously in increased comovement. The results of this paper show that this e¤ect is stronger if trade
integration is preceded by harmonization of labor market structures.
9Numerous papers have investigated the channels through which trade can a¤ect long run unem-
ployment abstracting from the role of country-specic labor market characteristics. See for instance
Davidson et al. (1999), Davidson and Matisz (2004), Felbermayr, Prat, and Schmerer (2008), and
Egger and Kreickemeier (2009).
10Furthermore, Helpman and Itskhoki disallow for forward-looking behavior of workers and rms
on the labor market, which is a crucial feature of my model.
11See, for instance, Bergin and Glick (2003), Corsetti, Martin and Pesenti. (2006), Contessi
(2006) and Zlate (2008).
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role for the endogenous propagation of shocks via trade.
Finally, the paper is related to a recent literature that focuses on the business
cycle implications of trade integration. For example, Arkolakis (2008) builds a
model of aggregate uctuations and vertical specialization in international trade,
showing that stronger vertical trade linkages between countries can enhance the
synchronization of business cycles. Drodz and Nosal (2008) address the link between
trade and comovement in a model with low short-run price elasticity of trade and
high long-run elasticity. Di¤erently from these papers, I focus on the role of labor
market frictions in a model with endogenous product market dynamics.12
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model.
Section 3 discusses the calibration. Section 4 presents steady-state and dynamic
e¤ects of trade integration. Sections 5 and 6 focus on business cycle implications of
trade integration and labor market structure. Section 6 concludes.
2.2 The Model
I begin developing a version of the model under nancial autarky.
2.2.1 Household Preferences and Intratemporal Choices
The world consists of two countries, home and foreign. Foreign variables are de-
noted with a superscript star. Each economy is populated by a unit mass of atom-
istic households. All contracts and prices are written in nominal terms and prices
are exible.13 Each household is thought of as a large extended family contain-
ing a continuum of members along a unit interval. In equilibrium some members
will be unemployed while some others will be producing. Household members per-
12A few other papers have introduced search and matching frictions of the form used here in
otherwise standard international business cycle models, but none of these papers focused on the
consequences of trade integration. For instance, Hairault (2004) studies the e¤ects of search and
matching frictions in a two-country real business cycle model, showing that labor market frictions
improve the ability of the model to generate comovement in labor inputs and investment across
countries. Campolmi and Faia (2008) develop a DSGE model of a currency area with sticky
prices and labor market frictions to study whether cyclical ination di¤erentials observed for EMU
countries can be explained by di¤erences in labor market institutions.
13For this reason I do not model demand for currency and resort to a cashless economy as in
Woodford (2003).
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fectly ensure each other against variation in labor income due to employment or
unemployment. There is no ex post heterogeneity across individuals.
The representative household maximizes the following utility function:
u(C) = Et
( 1X
s=t
s t
C1 s
1  
)
; (2.1)
where  2 (0; 1) is the subjective discount factor and  > 0 is the inverse of the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution. At time t the household consumes a basket
of goods Ct dened over a continuum 
 :
Ct = (
R
!2

ct(!)
 1
 d!)

 1 ;
where  > 1 is the symmetric elasticity of substitution across goods.
At any given point in time only a subset of goods 
t 2 
 is available. Let pt(!)
be the home nominal price for the good ! 2 
t: The consumption-based price index
for the home economy is
Pt = [
R
!2

pt(!)
1 d!]
1
1  ;
and homes demand for each individual variety ! is:
ct(!) = (
pt(!)
Pt
) Yt;
where Yt is the aggregate demand in the home country.
The foreign household maximizes a similar utility function, with identical para-
meters. The foreign consumption basket is:
Ct = (
R
!2

ct (!)
 1
 d!)

 1 :
Importantly, the subset of goods available for consumption in the foreign econ-
omy during period t is 
t 2 
 and can di¤er from the subset of goods that are
available in the home economy. Similar to the home economy, the foreign con-
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sumption based price index is P t = [
R
!2

pt (!)1 d!]
1
1  and foreign demand for an
individual good ! is ct (!) = (
pt (!)
P t
) Y t .
2.2.2 Firms and the Labor Market
In each country there is a continuum of monopolistically competitive rms, each
producing a di¤erent variety !. Production requires only labor and it is charac-
terized by constant returns to scale. Firms are heterogenous as they produce with
di¤erent technologies indexed by relative productivity z. From now on, to save no-
tation, I will abuse language by identifying a rm with its productivity z, omitting
the variety index !:14
Firms are subject to aggregate and idiosyncratic productivity shocks. Zt is the
stochastic aggregate productivity, common to all rms. In addition, within each
rm, there are idiosyncratic job specic productivity shocks.15 Those are i:i:d:
draws from a time invariant distribution with cdf H(), assumed to be independent
of rms productivity z and identical across countries. To summarize: the lled job
i at rm z produces zZtai;t units of output at time t. The timing of the model is
described in Table 1.
I model labor market frictions within the context of a large rm set up, in
order to allow both size and number of producing rms to vary in response to
aggregate shocks. Each rm employs a continuum of workers. Within each rm,
the stock of labor varies because of the variation in hiring (job creation) and ring
(job destruction).
To hire a new worker each rm has to post a vacancy, incurring in a cost  -
expressed in units of the aggregate consumption basket Ct and, most importantly,
14 In this continuum setting, the number of rms with a productivity z is g(z)dz, the density at
z. So potentially, there is "more than one" single rm with such a productivity. Formally, each
of these rms has a di¤erent identity (each of them produces a unique di¤erentiated variety !).
However, as I will show later, they all behave in exactly the same way. They are indistinguishable
from their actions. For this reason I can safely omit the variety label !. I also use the same index
z for both Home and Foreign rms as this variable only captures rm productivity relative to the
distribution of rms in the country.
15 I introduce job-specic idiosyncratic shocks to induce endogenous job destruction in the model.
The latter is required to make e¤ective the role of ring costs in the model.
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independent of z. The probability of nding a worker depends on a constant return
to scale matching technology, which converts aggregate unemployed workers Ut and
aggregate vacancies Vt into aggregate matches Mt:
M(Ut; Vt) = U
"
t V
1 "
t ; 0 < " < 1:
Dening labor market tightness as t  VtUt , each rm meets unemployed workers
at a rate q(t) =
M(Ut;Vt)
Vt
: I assume that newly created matches become immediately
productive. For an individual rm, the inow of new hires in t is therefore q(t)vz;t;
where vz;t is the number of vacancies posted by an incumbent with productivity z.
Firms and workers can separate for exogenous and endogenous motives. When
the rm nds a match to be no longer protable, it can dismiss the worker but it
has to incur a constant ring tax F , also independent of rms specic productivity
z.16
Firm output is determined by the measure lz;t of jobs, the rm specic productiv-
ity z, the aggregate productivity Zt and the aggregate over job specic idiosyncratic
shocks az;t =
1Z
az;t
a dH(a)1 H(acz;t) :
yz;t = zZtaz;tlz;t; (2.2)
where acz;t is the (endogenous) critical threshold below which a rm z destroys
non protable jobs with a realization at(i) < acz;t. This results in an endogenous
within-rm job destruction rate H(acz;t):
Within rm separation has also an exogenous component %. This represents
the fraction of jobs that are exogenously separated at the beginning of each period,
identical across all producers.17
16As in Thomas (2006), ring costs take the form of a pure ring tax. Severance transfers from
the rm to the worker have no allocative e¤ects in the standard model with Nash wage bargaining.
17This assumption ensures that, in presence of small aggregate shocks, there are no corner so-
lution with zero hiring in the rms maximization problem. I assume that when the separation is
exogenous, no ring costs are paid.
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The law of motion of employment for the producer z is given by :
lz;t = [1 H(acz;t)][(1  %)lz;t 1 + q(t)vz;t]: (2.3)
Endogenous entry of producers is modelled as in Ghironi and Melitz (2005).
Prior to entry, rms are identical and face an entry cost fE;t , to be specied later on.
Upon entry, home rms draw their productivity level z from a common distribution
G(z) with support on [zmin;1). Foreign rms draw their productivity level from
an identical distribution. This relative productivity level remains xed thereafter.
There are no xed costs of production. Hence, all rms that enter the economy
produce in every period until they are hit by a "death" shock, which occurs with
probability  2 (0; 1) in every period.18 When a rm leaves the market, its entire
stock of workers becomes unemployed, joining the pool of searchers in the next
period. I assume that exiting rms bear no costs associated with the workers
layo¤.
Home and foreign rms can serve both their domestic market as well as the
export market. Exporting is costly and it involves both a per unit iceberg trade
cost  t > 1 (t > 1) and a per-period xed cost fX;t (fX;t).
19 I assume that the
xed export cost is paid in units of consumption: to serve the foreign market each
exporting rm needs to purchase a bundle of materials that has the same composition
of the domestic consumption basket.20
18 I abstract from the endogenous decision of rms to leave the market to preserve model
tractability.
19Empirically, there is substantial evidence that a big portion of export costs are indeed sunk. The
presence of sunk export costs would signicantly complicate the models solution. Qualitatively,
the assumption of xed rather than sunk export costs is harmless. Their quantitative relevance is
left for further investigation.
20 I assume that the xed export cost is paid in units of consumption for simplicity. Alternatively,
fX;t could be denominated in units of labor, as in GM. Assuming that workers can be employed
either in production of nal goods or in the production of export services would complicate the
model due to the presence of labor market fricitons. A version of the model with the export cost
denominated in units of labor is available upon request.
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Incumbent Firms
An incumbent with productivity z minimizes the following cost function:
Costt(z) = Et
1X
s=0
t+sf wz;slz;s + vz;s +H(acz;t)Fg;
where t+1 = (1   )(Ct+1Ct )  is the households discount factor adjusted for
the exogenous exit probability. The rst term of the cost function reects the wage
bill of the rm. Wages are not identical across workers, but they depend on the
idiosyncratic productivities of jobs. Therefore, wz;t is the aggregate of individual
wages paid by the incumbent z, taken as given by the producer. The second and
third terms reect vacancy and ring costs respectively. The two constraints are
(2.2) and (2.3).
Combining the rst-order conditions for lz;t, vz;t and acz;t it is possible to de-
rive job creation (JC) and job destruction (JD) curves for a producer with relative
productivity z:

qt
= 'z;tzZt
1R
acz;t
(a  acz;t)dH(a) 
1R
acz;t
(w(a)  w(acz;t))dH(a) F; (2.4)
'z;tzZta
c
z;t+F + Ett;t+1

qt+1
= wcz;t; (2.5)
where 'z;t is the Lagrange multipliers attached to the output constraint, repre-
senting the rms real marginal revenue.
The job creation equation states that the expected marginal cost of posting a
vacancy - q(t) - has to be equal to the expected marginal benet. The job destruc-
tion equation denes the job-specic productivity threshold acz;t: each producer has
to be indi¤erent between keeping and ring the marginal worker. The marginal
benet of that match is given by its marginal revenue product augmented by the
saving from paying ring costs and posting a new vacancy in the next period. The
marginal cost is the wage bill.
The behavior of each producer z on the labor market can be summarized by
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mean of job creation, job destruction and aggregate wage equations. The wage
schedule is obtained through the solution of an individual Nash bargaining process.
The bargaining solution splits the surplus of the match between the rms and the
workers outside option. The analytical derivation of the wage scheduled is presented
in Appendix A, here I report the equilibrium wage resulting from the bargaining
between a worker with a generic idiosyncratic productivity a and a producer with
productivity z:
wz;t(a) = ('z;tzZta+ t + (1  Ett+1)F ) + (1  )B; (2.6)
where t+1= (1  pt+1)(1 %)Ett+1and B is the unemployment benet received
by the worker if unemployed.
The match specic wage rate is increasing in the real marginal value product
- 'z;tzZtat, labor market tightness and size of unemployment benets. A higher
expected probability of ring the worker instead lowers wz;t(a).
The aggregate real wage is the average of the individual wages, weighted accord-
ing to the distribution of the idiosyncratic productivities:
wz;t =
1Z
acz;t
wz;t(a)
dH(a)
1 H(acz;t)
: (2.7)
Substituting equations (2.6) and (2.7) in (2.4) and (2.5) the job creation and
destruction equations can be restated as:
k
qt
= 'z;tzZt(az;t   acz;t)(1 H(acz;t)) F; (2.8)
'z;tzZta
c
z;t = [B +
1
1   (t  

q(t)
  (1 + Ett+1)F ]: (2.9)
Similarly, in the foreign country:
k
qt
= 'z;tzZ

t (a

z;t   acz;t)(1 H(acz;t)) F ; (2.10)
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'z;tzZ

t a
c
z;t = [B
 +
1
1   (
t  

q(t )
  (1 + Ett+1)F ]; (2.11)
where it is understood that all the labor market parameters are (potentially)
asymmetric across home and foreign countries.
Prot Maximization
All rms face a residual demand curve with constant elasticity of substitution  in
both markets and set fully exible prices that reects the same proportional markup

 1 over the real marginal cost 'z;t. Let pD;t(z) and pX;t(z) (p

D;t(z) and p

X;t(z))
denote the nominal domestic and export prices of a home (foreign) rm. I assume
that export prices are denominated in the currency of export market. Prices, in real
terms relative to the price index in the destination market, are given by:
D;t(z)  pD;t(z)Pt =

 1'z;t; X;t(z) 
pX;t(z)
P t
=  tQt D;t(z);
D;t(z) 
pD;t(z)
P t
=  1'

z;t; 

X;t(z) 
pX;t(z)
Pt
= Qt

t

D;t(z),
where Qt  "tP

t
Pt
is the consumption-based real exchange rate (units of consump-
tion per units of foreign consumption; "t is the nominal exchange rate, units of home
currency per units foreign).
Due to the presence of xed export costs, fX;t, a rm may decide not to export in
any given period since expected prots cannot cover fX;t. When making this decision
a rm decompose its total real prot dt(z) into portions earned from domestic sales
dD;t(z) and from potential export sales dX;t(z):
dt(z) = dD;t(z) + dX;t(z);
where all the prots are expressed in units of the consumption basket in the rms
location. In particular:
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dD;t(z) =
1
 (D;t(z))
1 Yt
dX;t(z) =
8<:
Qt
 (X;t(z))
1 Y t   fX;t if rm z exports
0 otherwise
:
A rm will export if and only if the expected prot from exporting is non-
negative. There exists a home (foreign) cut-o¤ productivity zX;t (zX;t) such that:
zX;t = inffz : dX;t(z) > 0g. I assume that the lower bound cost zmin is low enough to
have zX;t (zX;t) > zmin. This ensures the existence of an endogenously determined
non-traded sector: rms with a productivity draw z below zX;t(zX;t) only produce
for their domestic market in period t. The set of exporting rms uctuates over
time with changes in protability of export.
2.2.3 Aggregation
As in Melitz (2003) I dene two special "average" productivity levels (proportional
to the relative output shares): an average ezD for all producing rms in each country,
and an average ezX;t(ezX;t) for all home (foreign) exporters:
~zd = ~z

d = [
1R
zmin
z 1dG(z)]
1
 1 ;
~zx;t = [
1
1 G(zx;t) ]
1R
zx;t
z 1dG(z)]
1
 1 ; ~zx;t = [
1
1 G(zx;t)
]
1R
zx;t
z 1dG(z)]
1
 1 :
Melitz (2003) shows that all aggregate variables can be summarized by mean of
these productivity averages. This paper extends Melitzs result in a dynamic model
with search and matching frictions in the labor market. Two su¢ cient conditions for
the result are: (a) production function is linear in labor; (b) hiring and ring costs
are linear and identical across plants (i.e. independent of rms specic productivity
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z).21 Melitzs aggregation survives because these two assumptions ensure that the
rms real marginal cost can still be written in the form:
'z;t =
't
z
;
where 't, still to be dened, is a component of the rm real marginal cost identical
across plants.22
In Appendix B and C, I show that such a representation exists. Conditions (a)
and (b) imply that the wage rate and the within rm job destruction cut o¤ acz;t are
independent of the rms specic productivity z. From (2.9) it follows immediately
that 'z;t can be written as 'z;t =
't
z . Intuitively, since both hiring and ring costs
are independent of z, the outside option of each producer - not being matched with
a particular worker - is identical across producers and it depends only on aggregate
outcomes. As a result, labor market frictions a¤ect the rm real marginal cost
symmetrically up to di¤erentials in the specic productivity z. For this reason, the
relative productivity z uniquely di¤erentiates the impact of labor market frictions
across producers and average productivities can still summarize all the relevant
macroeconomic outcomes as in the original Melitzs model.23
The term 't - which I will call "average" real marginal revenue henceforth -
is identical across all producers and summarizes all the relevant information about
aggregate labor market conditions, including the symmetric wage rate. The average
21The model has no capital. The number of rms in the economy can be interpreted as the
capital stock of the economy since entry is indeed nanced by householdsinvestment.
22 In a model with Walrasian labor we would have: 'Melitzz;t =
't
z
= wt
zZt
.
23Technically, in order to show that such a representation exists, I rst need to prove that all the
rms with relative technology z are identical regardless of their timing of entry. The issue arises
due to the presence of labor market frictions. Among producers with a productivity draw z, rms
will be identical at any point in time if new entrants nd optimal to target the same workforce
of incumbents. In this case when new plants begin production the only di¤erence with any other
incumbent z will be that they are producing a di¤erent variety and there is no need to keep track
of all the cohorts of entrants (for each realization of z). In Appendix B I show that (a) and (b) are
su¢ cient conditions for the result.
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marginal cost 't can be expressed as:
't =
~wt
Zt
+
1
Zt
f
k
qt
+ F
(1 H(act))(at act)
g.24 (2.12)
It follows that :
'z;t =
~wt
zZt
+
1
zZt
f
k
qt
+ F
(1 H(act))(at act)
g; (2.13)
'z;t =
~wt
zZt
+
1
zZt
f
k
qt
+ F 
(1 H(act ))(at act )
g; (2.14)
The presence of search and matching frictions in the labor market shows up
in the real marginal cost for a producer z as an extra component with respect
to a model with Walrasian labor markets. Labor market frictions, by a¤ecting
the rms marginal cost, inuence the protability of entry and export decisions
following aggregate shocks. As a result, di¤erences in the labor market structure
like the size of hiring and ring costs or the generosity of unemployment benets, can
imply asymmetric responses of the marginal cost across countries, a¤ecting country
interdependence.
As the productivity averages ~zD and ~zX;t summarize all the relevant information
for aggregate outcomes, the model is isomorphic to one where ND;t (ND;t) rms with
productivity level zD and workforce lD;t (lD;t) produce to serve the domestic market
and NX;t (NX;t) rms with productivity zX;t (z

X;t) and stock of labor lX;t(l

X;t)
export to the foreign (home) market. In particular:
lD;t = [1 H(act)][(1  %)lD;t 1 + q(t)vD;t]
lX;t = [1 H(act)][(1  %)lX;t 1 + q(t)vX;t]
,
where vD;t and vX;t are respectively the vacancies posted by rms producing for
the domestic and export market.
The average relative price of domestic goods is then:
24Notice that ~wt =
1R
acz;t
(w(a)  w(act)) dH(a)1 G(act ) , while wt =
1Z
acz;t
w(a) dH(a)
1 G(act )
:
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~D;t  D;t(~zD) =  1 't~zD (D;t  ~D;t(~zD) =

 1
't
~zD
);
while the average export price is:
~X;t  X;t(~zX;t) =  1  tQt
't
~zX;t
(~X;t  X;t(~zX;t) =  1Qtt 't~zX;t ).
The nominal price indexes Pt and P t can be written as:25
1 = ND;t(~D;t)
1  +NX;t(~

X;t)
1  ;
1 = ND;t(~

D;t)
1  +NX;t(~X;t)
1  :
2.2.4 Parametrization
Following Melitz (2003) and Ghironi and Melitz (2005) I parametrize the distribution
of rm productivity draws G(z) assuming that z is drawn from a Pareto with lower
bound zmin and shape parameter k > (   1).26
The average productivities ~zD; ~zX;t and ~zX;t are given by:
~zD = [
k
k   (   1) ]
1
 1
~zX;t = [
k
k   (   1) ]
1
 1 zX;t; ~z

X;t = [
k
k   (   1) ]
1
 1 zX;t:
The shares of exporting rms in each period are:
NX;t
ND;t
= 1 G(zX;t) = (zmin
~zX;t
) k(
k
k   (   1))
k
 1
NX;t
ND;t
= 1 G(zX;t) = (
zmin
~zX;t
) k(
k
k   (   1))
k
 1 :
25This follows from:
Pt = ND;t(~pD;t)
1  +NX;t(~p

X;t)
1  ;
P t = N

D;t(~p

D;t)
1  +NX;t(~pX;t)
1  :
26The assumption of a Pareto distribution induces a size distribution of rms that is also Pareto.
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Finally the zero prot conditions to determine the cuto¤ imply that zX;t and
zX;t must satisfy:
~dX;t =
 1
k ( 1)fX;t ~d

X;t =
 1
k ( 1)f

X;t:
Firm Entry and Exit
In every period there is an unbounded mass of perspective entrants in both countries.
Potential entrants are forward looking and correctly anticipate their future prots
ds(z) in any period s > t as well as the exogenous probability  of incurring in the
exit-inducing shock: Entrants at time t will start producing only from t+ 1.
Perspective entrants compute their expected post-entry value - ~et - dened as
the present discounted value of the expected stream of per period prots ds:
~et = Et
1
s=t+1sds: (2.15)
Prior to entry, rms face a sunk entry cost:
fE;t = fR;t + 
ld;t + [1 G(zx;t)]lx;t
qt
; (2.16)
to be paid in order to serve the market. The entry cost fE;t consists of two compo-
nents. The rst term, fR;t; represents the cost associated to regulation and barriers
to entry. Its exogenous and potentially subject to shocks. As the xed export cost,
it is expressed in units of the aggregate consumption basket Ct. The second term
in equation (2.16) instead reects the fact that, upon entry, new entrants need to
build their stock of labor to begin production.27
Entry occurs until rm value is equalized to the entry cost, leading to the free
entry condition:28
~et = fE;t
27The rst component - 
qt+1
lD;t - is the cost associated to the labor input required to begin
domestic production. The second one - 
qt
[1   G(zX;t)]lX;t - is instead the stock of labor required
to export to the foreign country (weighted by the probability of being an exporter).
28This condition holds as long as the mass of new entrants NE;t is positive. I assume that
macroeconomic shocks are small enough for this condition to hold in each period.
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Similar conditions hold in the foreign country:
fE;t = f

R;t + 
 lD;t+[1 G(zX;t)]lX;t
qt
~et = fE;t:
The labor recruitment cost it is endogenous and it responds to aggregate labor
market conditions. In particular, it is procyclical: as the labor market is tighter -
ceteris paribus - entry is more costly due to a congestion externality generated by
the presence of search and matching frictions in the labor market (t is higher and
hence the expected cost of lling a vacancy q(t) is higher ).
Given the time to build assumption, the law of motion of rms is given by
Nt = (1   )(Nt 1 +NE;t 1). The number of producing rms represents the stock
of capital of the economy. It behaves much like physical capital in a standard RBC
model, but it has an endogenously uctuating price given by (2.15). In particular,
the key interaction between labor and product market dynamics is captured by
the stock market price of investment et: it endogenously uctuates in response to
aggregate shocks and it summarizes the interdependence between product and labor
market dynamics.
2.2.5 Household Budget Constraint and First Stage Budgeting
The representative household can invest in two types of assets: shares in a mutual
fund of domestic rms29 and domestic risk-free bonds. Let xt be the share in the
mutual fund of domestic rms held by the representative household entering period
t. The mutual fund includes all the domestic rms existing at time t - ND;t +NE;t
- even though only a fraction (1  ) of those will be producing in t+ 1. The price
of one share at time t is equal to the price of claims to future rms real prots ~et.
The per period households budget constraint can be written as:
Bt+1+Ct+~et(ND;t+NE;t)xt+1 = (1+rt)Bt+( ~dt+~et)ND;txt+ wtLt+B(1 Lt)+Tt;
(2.17)
29New entrants nance entry on the stock market in this model.
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where rt is the real interest rate on bond holdings (known with certainty as
of t   1), B(1   Lt) represents the total amount of unemployment benets and Tt
are lump sum taxes. The household maximizes (2.1) subject to (2.17). The Euler
equations for bond and share holdings are respectively:
1 = (1 + rt)Et(
Ct+1
Ct
)  and ~et = (1  )Et(Ct+1
Ct
) ( ~dt+1 + ~et+1):
2.2.6 Equilibrium
We are now able to characterize the equilibrium of the model. First, I derive aggre-
gate variables in the labor market. Aggregate employment - Lt - can be expressed as
the sum of total employment in domestic production (LD;t) and export production
(LX;t):
Lt  LD;t + LX;t = ND;tlD;t +NX;tlX;t;
Total vacancies Vt are the sum of total vacancies posted by incumbents for do-
mestic and export production and the vacancies posted by new entrants to build
their initial stock of labor:
Vt= ND;tvD;t+NX;tvX;t+NE;t[
lD;t + [1 G(zX;t)]lX;t
qt
]:
The partition of workers between domestic and export sector satises:
LX;t = X;tLD;t;
where X;t = (
zmin
zX;t
) k( kk +1)
k
 1Qt (
 tzD
zX;t
)1  Y

t
Yt
. The current stock of unem-
ployed workers is given by Ut = (1  Lt).
Aggregate demand in the domestic market is given by:
Yt = Ct +NE;tfR;t +NX;tfX;t + Vt;
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while in the foreign economy it is given by:
Y t = C

t +N

E;tf

R;t +N

X;tf

X;t + 
V t :
The aggregate resource constraint for the economy can be obtained by imposing
the equilibrium conditions Bt = Bt+1 = 0, xt = xt+1 = 1 and B(1  Lt) = Tt,.
We obtain:
Ct +NE;t~et = ND;t ~dt + wtLt:
Total consumption plus investment has to be equal to total income (labor income
plus dividends).
To close the model, observe that nancial autarky implies balanced trade. The
value of home exports must equal the value of foreign exports:
QtNX;t(~X;t)
1 Y t = N

X;t(~

X;t)
1 Yt:
Table 2 summarizes the model equations.
2.2.7 International Trade in Bonds
To perform quantitative exercises I will relax the assumption of nancial autarky,
by introducing incomplete nancial markets. The relevant model equations are pre-
sented in Table 3. International assets markets are incomplete. Agents can trade
bonds domestically and internationally. Home (foreign) households issue home (for-
eign) bonds, denominated in home (foreign) currency. Bonds issued by each country
provide a risk-free real return in units of that countrys consumption basket. To
avoid indeterminacy of the steady state net foreign assets and nonstationary model
dynamics I assume that agents must pay fees to domestic nancial intermediaries
when adjusting their bond holdings (see Ghironi, 2006).30 The change in asset
holdings between t and t+ 1 is the countrys current account.
30These fees are quadratic functions of the stock of bonds. Financial intermediaries rebate the
revenues from bond-adjustment fees to domestic households.
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There are now three Euler equations in each country: the Euler equations for
domestic and foreign bond holdings and the Euler equation for share holdings (un-
changed). Since there is no longer balanced trade under international bond trading,
I also replace the balanced current account condition from the model with nancial
autarky with the expression for the balance of international payments.
To conclude, for future references, it is useful to dene the following variables:
 ]TOLt = Qt'

t
't
is the average terms of labor: the ratio between the cost of pro-
duction abroad and the cost of production at home. This variables summarizes
the relative impact of labor market frictions (and labor market regulation) in
the two countries.
 ]TOT t = Qt~X;t~X;t represent the average terms of trade, the ratio between the
average price of home exports to the average price of home imports (or the
average quantity of foreign exports per one unit of home exports).
 ~Pt = N
1
 1
t Pt and ~P

t = N

1
 1
t P

t (where Nt = ND;t +N

X;t and N

t = N

D;t +
NX;t) denote home and foreign average prices. In a model where the number
of goods available for consumption is endogenous and preferences exhibit love
for variety, there is a disconnection between consumption based price indexes
and their data counterpart.31 It is possible to decompose the price indexes into
component reecting the average prices and the product variety: the average
prices ~Pt and ~P t corresponds much more closely to the empirical measure such
as the CPI.
 ~Qt = ( NtNt )
1
 1Qt is the theoretical counterpart to the empirical real exchange
rate.32
31Price indexes change over time both because of changes in the average prices as well as for the
variety e¤ect implied by entry of new rms and availability of new goods in the economy. CPI data
instead are based on average prices and they are not constantly adjusted for availability of new
varieties.
32See Ghironi and Melitz (2005) for a discussion.
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2.3 Calibration
2.3.1 Symmetric Countries
I interpret periods as quarters and calibrate the model to match selected targets of
the U.S. economy.
As standard practice for quarterly business cycle models I set the discount factor
 = :99 implying an annual real interest rate of 4%. The value of the risk aversion
coe¢ cient  is equal to 2. I set the symmetric elasticity of substitution across
varieties  = 3:8 to t U.S. plant and macro trade data (see Bernard et al., 2003).33
The shape parameter k in the Pareto distribution is chosen to match the standard
deviation of log U.S. plant sales, which in the data is equal to 1:67. The lower bound
of the distribution zmin is normalized to 1. The xed export cost fX is chosen to
match the share of exporting plants, equal to 21%. I assume  = 1:3, in line with
Ghironi and Melitz (2005) and Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (2001).
Christopher (2003) compiles an index for entry delay as the number of business
days that it takes (on average) to fulll entry requirements. I follow Ebell and
Haefke (2009) to convert this index in months of lost output to get a value of the
regulation cost fR: The index for the U.S. is 8:5, corresponding to 0:15 quarters of
lost output (based on 220 business days in a year).
As concerns the labor market, I set the elasticity of the matching function " = 0:5
(consistent with empirical evidence reported in Blanchard, 1999).
In order to calibrate the exogenous within rm separation - % - and the exogenous
exit of plants -  - I target the portion of job destruction due to the exit of plants
and the ratio between job destruction and employment observed in the data. Davis,
Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996) report a plant exit rate of 20% in the U.S.; they
also nd that the ratio between job destruction and employment is equal to 0:052.
33A value of  = 3:8 implies a mark-up of 35.7% relative to marginal costs, which is in the range
of 3% to 70% of di¤erent empirical studies as documented by Schmitt-Grohe (1997). The standard
choice in the international literature is a mark up lower than 20%. As pointed out by Ghironi and
Melitz (2005), in models with a xed number of varieties a rms dont pay sunk entry costs, which
creates a gap between average and marginal costs. Thus, although  = 3:8 implies a fairly high
markup over marginal cost, this parametrization delivers reasonable markups over average costs.
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Appendix D describes the procedure in more detail.
Unemployment benets take the form: B = hP + Rw
SS . The replacement rate
is  R = 0:54, taken from the OECD (2004) "Benets and Wages" publication. As
standard in the literature, I assume that ring taxes in the United States are zero.
Since F =  Fw
SS , I set  F = 0.
In absence of empirical guidance, the bargaining power of workers is set to a
conventional value of  = 0:5.
Three labor market parameters are left to calibration. The cost of posting a
vacancy , the ow value of home production hP , the e¢ ciency of the matching
function . As common practice in the literature, I choose , hP and  in order to
match the steady state unemployment rate USS , the probability of lling a vacancy
qSS and the total separation rate T . I set USS = 7%, computed from quarterly
data on U.S unemployment. Total separation T is set to 7%, an average of the
values reported by Shimer (2005) and Fujita and Ramey (2007). The probability of
lling a vacancy is qSS = 0:7, as in Shimer (2005) and Fujita and Ramey (2007).
The idiosyncratic job specic productivity shocks a are lognormally distributed
with mean  and standard deviation A: The parametrization follows den Haan,
Ramey, and Watson (2000): I normalize  to 0, calibrating A to match the rel-
ative volatility of unemployment with respect to GDP. The benchmark symmetric
calibration is summarized in Table 4.
2.3.2 Asymmetric Labor Markets
I assume that the rigid economy (home) corresponds to the Euro Area, while the
relatively more exible country (foreign) is represented by U.S.34
In a model with search and matching frictions a la Mortensen and Pissarides
(1994) there are parameters for which no data are readily available:  (cost of posting
a vacancy), hP (home production), { (matching e¢ ciency), and A (variance of
34The model abstracts from cross country asymmetries in factor endowments and the role of
comparative advantage. At the same time though, Botero, Djankov, Porta, and Lopez-De-Silanes
(2004) and OECD (2004) report substantial di¤erences in terms of labor market characteristics
across the two economies. Hence, the choice of the Euro Area as a benchmark rigid trading partner
is quite natural in this context.
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idiosyncratic shocks). As already discussed, the standard approach is to calibrate
those parameters to match selected rst and second moments of the labor market
in the data. Countries usually considered rigid like the Euro Area tend to be quite
di¤erent in terms of those targets.
In the benchmark calibration I set such parameters to match country specic
targets, using U.S. and Euro Area data as a targets.35 U.S. targets are identical as
before. Instead I choose , hP and { to match unemployment rate, total separation
and probability of lling a vacancy observed in the European labor market. Steady
state unemployment is USSeu = 9:2%, computed from quarterly data. Total separa-
tion Teuis set to 3%, an average value of the evidence collected for the Euro Area
- see Christo¤el, Kuester, and Linzert (2009); qSSeu is equal to 0:7, which is in line
with estimates reported by ECB (2002) and Weber (2000). The replacement rate
is  R = 0:65, an average of values reported in OECD (2004) "Benets and Wages"
publication. To calibrate ring costs F =  Fw
SS , I follow Thomas and Zanetti
(2008) by setting  F = :2.
Another way to proceed would be instead to let only B and F di¤er across the
two countries, imposing symmetry on all the other parameters.36 As a robustness
check I have also re-calibrated the model following the latter strategy.
Table 5 summarizes the calibration under the assumption of asymmetric labor
markets. All the other parameters in the model are assumed to be identical across
countries in order to focus on the role of di¤erent labor market structures.
2.4 Steady State and Dynamic Implications of Trade Integration
In this section I study the gradual adjustment to a symmetric reduction in iceberg
trade costs  t and t .37 The novel feature with respect to previous studies is the
35The only exception is the variance of idiosyncratic job specic productivity. Given the assump-
tion of full symmetry in the structure of shocks across countries, I will impose that A = A.
36 In this case , hP  and  would be choosen to match standard moments of the U.S. labor
market, imposing symmetry between the rigid and exible economy:  = , hP = hP  and
 = . In this case U; %T and q in the rigid economy would be freely detemined.
37 It should be noticed that trade opennes in the model could also be interpreted as a reduction
in xed costs. Qualitatively a reduction in fX;t and fX;t generates similar patterns with respect to
falling trade costs. The impact is smaller in terms of magnitude, since a reduction in xed export
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characterization of the dynamic adjustment in the labor markets in presence of
di¤erent frictions across trading partners. Importantly, I restrict the analysis to a
perfect foresight exercise, assuming that no other aggregate shock hits the economy
after the unexpected, permanent symmetric change in  t and t .
2.4.1 Trade and Unemployment Outcomes in the Long Run
Before discussing the dynamic adjustment following trade integration, I focus on
the long run labor market e¤ects of lower trade barriers. In so doing, I compare the
predictions of the model with existing studies in the trade literature.
Despite the presence of rm heterogeneity, the long run behavior of aggregate
job creation and destruction summarizes all the e¤ects of trade integration on un-
employment. Consider rst a simplied version of the model which abstract from
endogenous separation - i.e. matches are destroyed only for exogenous reasons
(within and across rms) and assume full symmetry across trading partners.
The change in the steady state unemployment rate U can be written as:
dU
d
=  
EXO
d
d| {z }
U duration
=  
EXO'
d'
d|{z}
<0
> 0;
where 
EXO' =
(1  R)
+(1  R)(1 ) > 0. In this case the change in U is completely
summarized by the variation of labor market tightness  (interpreted as the change in
unemployment duration) - see Figure 1. Combining job creation and wage equations,
it is possible to see that the response of  depends on the change in the average real
marginal revenue '. Using the price index equation and the denition of domestic
and export prices, we have:
'=
   1

NT
1
 1| {z }
Variety
ez|{z}
TFP
;
costs mainly a¤ects rms that were not exporting before trade integration. Results are available
upon request.
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where NT = ND +NX and ~z is the average productivity across all rms:
~z = f 1
NT
[ND(~zD)
1  +NX(
~zX

)1  ]g 11  :
Notice that NT represents the total mass of varieties available to consumers in
any country (or alternatively, the total mass of rms competing in the country).38
The average marginal revenue is increasing both in the total mass of varieties
available to consumers NT and in the average productivity ~z. Since households
derive more welfare from spending a given nominal amount when NT is higher,
ceteris paribus, the relative price of each individual good increases (since the price
index decreases). This variety e¤ect increases the expected average marginal value
of a match '. At the same time, the increase in the average productivity ~z makes
workers on average more productive, rising '. For a reasonable parametrization of
the model, (symmetric) trade openness increases both NT and ~z. In particular, as 
falls, the reallocation of market shares toward exporting rms is enough to generate
an increase in average productivity, despite the absence of endogenous exit of least
productive plants.39 As a result, the average marginal revenue ' increases and so
does labor market tightness , lowering unemployment. Intuitively, the reduction in
trade barriers lowers search unemployment since the cost of vacancy posting relative
to the productivity of the average rm decreases and employers intensify recruitment
e¤orts. The long run average return to a match rises and more matches are created
following openness.
When both job creation and destruction are endogenous the analysis is slightly
more complicated. In this case the steady state change of the unemployment rate
38ND denotes the equilibrium mass of incumbent rms in any country. NX = [1 G(zX)]ND is
the mass of exporting rms among domestic producers.
39 ~z is a weighted average of domestic and exporting rmsproductivity. As trade barriers move
around, some among the most productive non-exporters begin to export and the market shares
of the domestic producers shrink due to increased foreign competition. This in turns implies that
in the denition of ~z more e¢ cient rms have a bigger weight. Even if the average productivity
of exporters ~zX is falling after openness (new exporters are less productive than already existing
ones), the gain in market shares of new exporting rms is enough to guarantee that ~z increases.
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can be written as:
dU = 
ada
c| {z }
Flows into U
  
d| {z }
U duration
where 
a and 
 are again two constant terms. The rst term reects the change in
job ows and it is summarized by the reservation productivity ac; the second term
again refers to changes in unemployment duration. Unemployment is increasing in
both terms. The e¤ects of openness on equilibrium unemployment depend now on
the impact of a reduction of  on  and ac, i.e. on the relative shifts of job creation
and job destruction curves - see Figure 2. The two curves can be written as:
JC curve :
k " + F
(1 H(ac))= '|{z}
TFP+VARIETY
Z(a  ac)
JD curve : ac=
1
'|{z}
TFP+VARIETY
f(1  )[(1  )k   k1 "] + B   ( + (1  ))Fg
Also in this case international trade triggers variations in ' which in turn a¤ects
both  and ac. Ceteris paribus,  is increasing in ', while ac falls. As before,
tightness  increases if the average marginal revenue of a new match is higher because
the expected return to vacancies gets bigger. At the same time the value of low
productive matches is boosted by a higher '. Both unemployment duration and
ows into unemployment tends to be reduced when ' rises, unambiguously lowering
the unemployment rate. The additional di¢ culty is that in general equilibrium,
variations in  and ac a¤ect each other and ' no longer summarizes the e¤ects on
unemployment. As ac falls, job creation further increases since now the expected
probability of destroying low productive matches is reduced (further increasing ).
At the same time though, as the labor market gets tighter, the aggregate wage
increases: marginal workers become less attractive, since they are now relatively
more expensive than before. This tends to reverse the drop in ac - increasing ows
into unemployment. On net,  unambiguously increases while ac can go in both
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direction. For a reasonable calibration of the model ac would fall, meaning that
more low productive matches survive in the new steady state and the overall ows
into unemployment are reduced.
A growing number of studies in the trade literature focuses on the long run
relationship between trade integration and unemployment. Those contributions dif-
ferentiate themselves with respect to the assumptions about the trade structure or
the mechanisms leading to equilibrium unemployment. Papers focusing on the role
of rm heterogeneity in presence of frictional unemployment yield di¤erent predic-
tions.40 In contrast to the present paper, Helpman and Itskhoki (2007) nd that
unemployment is not unambiguously lowered by trade openness. The symmetric
version of their model can feature a negative trade-unemployment link under some
parameterization. Di¤erently from the present model, they assume a two country -
two sector setup: trade boosts average productivity in the di¤erentiated goods sec-
tor, making employment more attractive in that sector. This yields a reallocation
of labor from the distortion-free numeraire sector into the friction-ridden di¤eren-
tiated good sector. Importantly, the impact of trade on unemployment operates
only through the reallocation of labor across sectors, because sectoral unemploy-
ment rates do not change in their model in response to trade.41 Felbermayr, Prat,
and Schmerer (2008) instead nd a negative long run relationship between trade in-
tegration and unemployment in a static model similar to the present one (but they
abstract from endogenous job destruction).
2.4.2 Transition Dynamics of Trade Reforms
Figure 3 and 4 plot the dynamic adjustment to a 1 percent drop in iceberg trade
costs  and . In Figure 3 trading partners are fully symmetric and exible,
while in Figure 4 the home economy has a relatively more rigid labor market, with
40An exaustive review is beyond the scope of this paper. Other contributions abstracting from
the role of rm heterogeneity or making alternative assumptions about the labor market structure
(fair wages) are Davidson, Matusz, and Shevchenko (2008), Matusz (1996), Egger and Kreickemeier
(2009) and Davis and Harrigan (2007).
41More workers search for jobs in the di¤erentiated sector when trade costs decline and therefore
aggregate unemployment rises when the di¤erentiated sector has higher sectoral unemployment and
aggregate unemployment falls when the di¤erentiated sector has lower sectoral unemployment.
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characteristics similar to the Euro Area.
The interaction between product and labor market dynamics is at the heart of
the transitional adjustment. As trade barriers are lowered, the incentives to create
and destroy jobs across producers change together with protability of entry into
domestic and export markets. The response of the labor market a¤ects product
market dynamics, and the endogenous adjustment in the number of producers feeds
back into labor market outcomes. Regardless of the labor market structure (exible
or rigid), the slow reallocation of workers and the sluggish variation in the number
of producers in the economy induce a long lasting transition: it takes time for
employment, consumption and GDP to reach their new (high) long run levels.
In the aftermath of trade integration, there are substantial gross job ows:
import-competing, domestic plants are downsizing while employment rises among
exporters. Entry of producers drops as the e¤ect of ercer domestic competition
prevails. Labor market characteristics determine the initial response of unemploy-
ment as they impact on protability of job creation and destruction. Figure 3 shows
that when the trading partners are fully symmetric and "exible", the compositional
shift of employment towards exporters does not trigger sizable net e¤ects on unem-
ployment in the aftermath of the shock. At the opposite, unemployment spikes in
the rigid economy in presence of asymmetric labor markets - see Figure 4. The intu-
ition is as follows. As the expected cost of ring and hiring workers is larger in the
rigid economy, exporters (and those who could potentially become exporters) have
less incentive to hire new workers compared to the exible country. At the same
time, due to ercer competition from abroad, domestic incumbents are downsizing
more heavily. The net e¤ect is that unemployment rises in the rigid country. In the
exible economy instead, unemployment is unambiguously reduced. Importantly, as
terms of trade ameliorate for the rigid country - the price of home (rigid) exports
rises with respect to the price of (foreign) imports - consumption increases despite
the negative initial unemployment response.
Employment rises slowly in both countries. As time passes by, producers in
the export sector can match with more workers and production of domestic (non
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traded) goods partially recovers as higher aggregate demand spreads out on all ex-
isting domestic and foreign varieties. As employment and wages are higher and
competition from abroad is lower, the foreign, exible, economy is now a more at-
tractive business environment. Entry protability recovers more compared to the
rigid country and production shifts towards foreign goods. This translates in di¤er-
ent unemployment dynamics across countries, with the exible economy beneting
relatively more. The consumption di¤erential between the rigid and exible econ-
omy is steadily increasing: the latter gains relatively more at any at any point in
time during the transition.
By allowing for international trade in bonds, asymmetries in labor markets in-
duce movements in the current accounts. Given the permanent nature of the shock,
there are no consumption smoothing motives a¤ecting their dynamics. The exible
country is a relatively more attractive economy after the trade shock and the return
on holding of shares is relatively higher there. Since the return on bond holdings
is tied to the return on holdings of shares by no arbitrage reasons, households in
the rigid home economy invest in foreign bonds in the aftermath of the reform.
By mean of nancial integration, home consumers can partially share the higher
benets arising from trade integration in the foreign country.
2.4.3 Welfare Consequences
The dynamic nature of the model allows me to calculate the welfare implications of
trade integration taking into account long run outcomes as well as the transitional
adjustment. Since the model features perfect risk sharing among family members
and no ex post heterogeneity between employed and unemployed workers, welfare
calculations here are meant to capture only aggregate implications of globalization.
The presence of distributional conicts between consumers in the economy cannot
be addressed in the present framework.
I calculate the fraction of aggregate consumption that would make the repre-
sentative household indi¤erent between the absence of trade integration (consuming
COLD in each period) and lowering trade barriers (consuming Ct - time varying
63
until the economy reaches the new steady state). For the home economy:
1X
s=t
s t
[ COLD(1 + )](1 )
1   =
1X
s=t
s t
[Ct]
(1 )
1   ; (2.18)
where  is the percentage increase in steady state (pre-openness) consumption
level that would make the household indi¤erent.
Assuming full symmetry in the labor markets, calculations show that for each
point reduction in  () the household would require an increase in consumption of
 =  = 4:82%: In presence of asymmetric labor markets also the compensation
would be asymmetric. In particular:  = 3:69% and  = 5:91%.
These numbers conveys two important messages. First, as expected, the rigid
labor market experiences a lower gains in terms of welfare. Secondly, exible coun-
tries benet from the rigidity of the trading partners: the welfare gain is higher than
in presence of symmetric (exible) labor markets.
2.5 International Trade and Macroeconomic Dynamics
So far I have studied the direct e¤ects of trade integration on unemployment and
economic activity, investigating whether the dynamic adjustment to the new steady
state can be a¤ected by country specic labor market characteristics. However,
trade integration can a¤ect economic outcomes and welfare also through its e¤ects
on the domestic and international propagation of business cycle shocks. In this
section instead, I focus on the e¤ects of stronger long run trade linkages for business
cycle dynamics.
I rst show that the interaction of product and labor market dynamics that
determines the direct consequences of trade integration is also at the heart of the
propagation of business cycle shocks. This novel transmission mechanism helps
the model to successfully account for key domestic and international business cy-
cles facts. I then turn to the implications of lowering trade barriers for aggregate
uctuations and the consequences of heterogeneous labor markets in this context.
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2.5.1 Impulse Responses
The model includes only one source of uctuations, the shocks to aggregate produc-
tivities Zt and Zt . I begin by describing the domestic and international adjustment
to a country specic productivity shock assuming full symmetry across countries.
Then, to illustrate the role of heterogeneity in labor market frictions for aggregate
uctuations, I consider the e¤ects of a temporary, global, increase in productivity.
Symmetric Labor Markets
I assume that productivity is described by the univariate process lnZt+1 = ZZ lnZt+
t; with the persistence parameter ZZ = 0:9. Figure 7 describes the aggregate dy-
namics under nancial autarky. On impact, higher Zt increases protability of
existing matches at home and incumbents reduce job destruction and post new va-
cancies. Domestic unemployment falls. The number of producers able to cover the
xed export cost fX;t increases: the productivity cuto¤ zX;t falls and the number of
exporters NX;t rises, further increasing vacancy posting and employment.
Employment and output unambiguously increase in the foreign economy on im-
pact. There are two mechanisms at work. First, aggregate demand at home increases
for all existing goods, domestic and foreign. Producers abroad anticipate that the
increase in demand will be persistently higher in the future. The expected protabil-
ity of existing and future matches rises inducing incumbents to post new vacancies
and save more low productive workers on impact. The presence of a rent sharing
mechanism, which tends to dampen the increase in wages further contributes to the
increase in employment.
Second, contrary to a standard international RBC model, the initial TOT de-
terioration is dampened by the presence of endogenous producer entry and rm
heterogeneity. As the home economy becomes a more attractive business environ-
ment, a larger number of rms enter the domestic market and post vacancies to
recruit workers for production in the next period. The home labor market gets
tighter and hiring costs increase (recruiting labor is more costly for all the produc-
ers since the probability of lling a vacancy is lower). Other things equal, this rises
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the average marginal cost and the average price of exported goods ~X;t. Further-
more the reduction in the average export productivity ~zX;t pushes ~X;t further up.
As a result, the expenditure switching towards home goods is dampened. Produc-
ers entry adjusts slowly due to the presence of search and matching friction in the
labor market. Output and employment dynamics also display hump shaped pat-
terns because of the sluggish adjustment in the product and labor market. The
slow variation in the number of producers feeds back into employment dynamics,
amplifying the initial e¤ects of the shock. Since labor market tightness increased
disproportionately more at home, hiring new workers become relatively cheaper in
the foreign country (the terms of labor, TOL, appreciate). The pattern of entry in
the home economy reverts, while the number of foreign rms entering the economy
continue to rise, increasing the number of exporters and further reducing foreign
unemployment.
As Figure 8 reveals, opening the economy to trade in nancial assets does not
change the propagation mechanism. The main di¤erence with respect to the autarky
case is the initial negative response of entry in the foreign country. As the home
economy becomes more productive, domestic households borrow from abroad to
nance entry of new rms, running a current account decit.42 As a result, nanc-
ing of new foreign rms drops. Initially, even in presence of nancial integration,
employment and GDP rises in both countries in the aftermath of the productivity
shock. In the model the incentives to shift resources towards the more productive
economy do not induce an asymmetric response of output across countries.
To summarize, the impulse responses highlight the central role of product and
labor market frictions for the domestic and international propagation of shocks.
Aggregate disturbances generate spikes in job creation and destruction and employ-
ment remains persistently higher on account of matching frictions. Protability of
entry responds to aggregate labor market conditions and the sluggish adjustment in
the number of producers on the market feeds back into employment dynamics mag-
42Current account dynamics revert during the transition to the steady state since domestic house-
holds want to smooth out the consequences of the favorable productivity shock by lending to foreign
households.
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nifying the future output e¤ects of the shock. This internal amplication implies
that shocks originating in one country can trigger sizable and long lasting e¤ects
in the trading partner. Persistent dynamics of aggregate demand induce persistent
e¤ects abroad, substantially increasing country interdependence.
Asymmetric Labor Markets
Empirical work has shown that di¤erences in labor market regulation can a¤ect do-
mestic labor market uctuations. For instance Micco and Pagés (2006), Messina and
Vallanti (2007) and Gomez-Salvador, Messina, and Vallanti (2004) nd that more
stringent labor laws a¤ects job ows over the business cycle - higher employment
protection leads to lower labor reallocation. To what extent the model is consistent
with such ndings? Do di¤erent labor market characteristics a¤ect country inter-
dependence and product market dynamics? To simplify the analysis, consider the
response of the home (rigid) and foreign (exible) economy to a global, temporary,
productivity shock.43 As before, the home economy features a relatively more rigid
labor market while the foreign country is maintained exible. Figure 8 shows that
key macroeconomic variables react di¤erently across countries: heterogenous labor
market characteristics traduce in asymmetric dynamics of unemployment and out-
put across countries. Specically, the rigid country is less responsive in the aftermath
of the shock but its dynamics are more persistent. Larger hiring and ring costs
slow down the decrease in unemployment. Job creation and destruction are, ceteris
paribus, less sensitive to the shock on impact, as the expected cost of a temporary
increase in the stock of labor is relatively higher compared to the exible country.
Home incumbents experience a smaller increase in employment and entry of new
rms in the aftermath of the shock. International nancial linkages amplify the im-
pact of labor market di¤erentials as resources are shifted towards the more exible
country.44The smaller response of producers entry at home feeds back into labor
43 I assume lnZt+1 = ZZ lnZ

t + 

t with ZZ = ZZ = :9.
44Households in the rigid economy nd protable to lend to the exible country to take advantage
of the more protable business conditions abroad. The rigid economy runs a current account surplus
on impact.
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market outcomes, further dampening the initial reduction in unemployment. At the
same time, larger unemployment benets tend to increase propagation by making
the wage rate to absorb less of the aggregate shock. Unemployment dynamics dis-
play more persistence in the more regulated economy. This result is in line with
the VAR analysis provided by Balakrishnan and Michelacci (2001), who nd that
unemployment is slower in adjusting to technology shocks in countries belonging to
the Euro Area with respect to the U.S. More persistent unemployment dynamics
translates into larger output persistence with respect to the foreign country. This
is consistent with the ndings in Duval, Elmeskov, and Vogel (2007).
2.5.2 International Business Cycle
I assume that the percentage deviations of Zt and Zt from the steady state follow
the bivariate process:
24 Zt
Zt
35 =
24 ZZ ZZ
ZZ ZZ
3524 Zt 1
Zt 1
35+
24 t
t
35 ;
For purposes of comparison with Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland (1992) (BKK
henceforth) and Ghironi and Melitz (2005) I use the symmetrized estimate of the
bivariate productivity process presented in BKK:
24 ZZ ZZ
ZZ ZZ
35 =
24 :906 :088
:088 :906
35 :
Innovations are zero-mean and normally distributed, with standard deviation set to
0:00852 and the correlation to 0:258 as estimated by BKK.
Regardless of the underlying labor market structure, I will assume the same
bivariate process for the percentage deviations of Zt and Zt and the same symmetric
variance and covariance matrix for productivity innovations.45 Moreover, since the
empirical price deators are best represented by the average prices ~Pt and ~P t in the
45 I do so to insulate the role of labor market asymmetries.
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model (as opposed to the welfare based price indexes), I report second moments of
real variables deated by ~Pt and ~P t .46
As shown in Tables 5 - 7, the standard deviations of aggregate output and
investment are very close to the data.47 Standard deviation of consumption, relative
to GDP, is over-predicted even though the model generates less volatile consumption
than GDP.
Unemployment volatility is matched by construction. Relative volatilities of
wages, job creation and job destruciton are in the range of what observed in the data.
The volatility of vacancies and labor market tightness is too small, but higher than
the values generated by a standard search and matching model with no sunk entry
costs. The model is also successful in matching the contemporaneous correlation
between output and unemployment but it does not deliver a su¢ ciently negative
Beveridge curve - the correlation between vacancies and unemployment.
Turning to the international business cycle, the cross country correlations of out-
put and labor inputs are positive. This is a signicant improvement with respect to
a standard international RBC.48 Product and labor market frictions are crucial to
generate the result since they induce internal amplication and dampen the TOT
deterioration following positive domestic shocks, inducing sizable and long lasting
e¤ects on the trading partner. As already pointed out by Hairault (2002), produc-
tivity spillovers across countries amplify the role of search frictions, since existing
and future matches become more productive everywhere in response to asymmetric
TFP shocks: producers post more vacancies and save more low-productive matches
also in the country not directly hit by the productivity boost.
The model is also able to generate a negative - but too large in absolute terms
- correlation between relative consumption spending and the real exchange rate.
As the original BKK model, the cross country correlation of consumption is larger
46To obtain such a measure, for any variable Xt in units of consumption, I dene its corresponding
real variable deated by the average price index: XR;t = PtXt~Pt .
47 I dene aggregate investment as NE;t~et.
48 In Ghironi and Melitz (2005), cross country GDPs correlation is positive, but smaller in absolute
terms than the one generated by this model (which is closer to the average correlations observed in
the data). Their model is also silent with respect to comovement of labor inputs, since they assume
inelastic labor supply.
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than the correlation across GDPs.49 The real exchange rate displays substantial
persistence, slightly higher than the one observed in the data.
To verify robustness I have also considered an alternative parametrization of the
productivity process consistent with Baxter and Crucini (1995). In this case:
24 ZZ ZZ
ZZ ZZ
35 =
24 :999 0
0 :999
35 ;
using the same variance-covariance matrix of the productivity innovations as in
BKK.
Results are not signicantly a¤ected, with two important exceptions.50 First,
cross-country correlation of consumption is now equal to 0:53; much lower than
before . In presence of productivity spillovers, the response of foreign consumption
to a home shock is larger as foreign households anticipate that foreign productivity
will raise too. Second, also the cross-country correlations in output and labor inputs
are lowered, being now respectively .298 and :302.
Overall, I interpret the results from the stochastic exercise as successful. The
performance of a standard international RBC model is improved with respect to
some key domestic and international business cycle dimensions. Furthermore, the
model is quite successful in accounting for important aspects of the cyclical behavior
of the labor market.
When labor markets are assumed to be asymmetric across countries, both domes-
tic and international business cycle properties are a¤ected.51 Conrming previous
impulse response analysis, output tends to be less volatile in absolute terms in the
rigid economy - volatility is 20% lower compared to the exible country. Moreover,
the asymmetric behavior of the labor markets, by triggering asymmetric e¤ects in
product market dynamics, lowers the cross-country correlations of output and con-
sumption.52
49As I will show, this result depends on the assumed parametrization of productivity.
50Results are not reported here for brevity. They are available upon request.
51Remember that the structure of shocks and any other feature of the model other than labor
markets is assumed to be symmetric across countries.
52Fonseca, Patureau, and Sopraseuth (2008) provide empirical support for the prediciton that
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2.6 Labor Markets and Business Cycle Implications of Trade Inte-
gration
What are the implications of stronger trade linkages for business cycle uctuations?
Do country specic labor market characteristics have an impact on the cyclical
behavior of integrating trading partners? These are the types of questions I want
to address in this section.
A robust conclusion from empirical work is that, among industrialized economies,
business cycles become more synchronized when trade linkages are stronger. In
particular, by running cross country regressions, Frankel and Rose (1998) and Clark
and van Wincoop (2001) nd that countries with 3.5 times larger trade have a
correlation that is 0.089 and 0.125 higher. Kose and Yi (2006) - reestimating the
Frankel and Rose (1998) regression with updated data - nd that a doubling of
the median (across all country pairs) bilateral trade intensity is associated with an
increase in the country pairs GDP correlation of about 0.06.
I rst explore whether the model can account for the observed increase in co-
movement following trade integration and discuss the role of labor market frictions
in such context. Then I analyze the model predictions for output volatility.
2.6.1 Output Comovement
Panel A in Figure 9 plots the e¤ects of lower trade barriers on cross-country output
correlation. I change the steady state values of trade costs  and  to generate
variations in bilateral trade volumes comparable with those reported in empirical
studies. Under nancial autarky, when steady state trade volumes increase by a
factor of 3.5 the model generates an increase in synchronization close to the values
reported by Clark and van Wincoop (2001). The mechanism behind the result
is simple and it is illustrated in Figure 8. First, as trade barriers are lowered,
the magnication e¤ect induced by sunk entry costs and labor market frictions
translates into larger and more persistent e¤ects of domestic shocks on foreign output
heterogeneity in labor market characteristics is associated to a smaller degree of syncronization.
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dynamics. Consider again the e¤ects of a domestic productivity boost. As the
endogenous response of employment and entry amplies the domestic e¤ect of the
shock, aggregate demand is high for a prolonged amount of time. When trade
barriers are lower, i.e. when the steady state trade volumes are higher, the dynamics
of home demand induce sizable and longer lasting e¤ects in the foreign economy (via
demand complementarities). Foreign output dynamics are a¤ected for a longer spell
of time and comovement increases.
Furthermore, as discussed before, the presence of rm heterogeneity and endoge-
nous entry mitigates terms of trade e¤ects and the reduction in trade barriers does
not automatically amplify the importance of expenditure switching e¤ects.
Importantly, the result survives in presence of nancial integration. As pointed
out by Kose and Yi (2001), when countries can trade in nancial assets, lower trade
costs increase the incentives to shift resources in response to aggregate disturbances.
Its more convenient to let production take place in the country where resources are
temporary more productive, thereby reducing international output correlation. This
resource shifting motive is still present but quantitatively less important: synchro-
nization is lower compared to nancial autarky, but still in the range of the average
values observed in the data. The result is not only due to the dampening of TOT
e¤ects due to the endogenous response of producer entry. Since the price of invest-
ment et is linked to labor market conditions by the free entry condition, foreign
households anticipate that the price of investment will be higher in the future as
nancing entry of foreign rms will become relatively more expensive when labor
market tightness will be higher. When trade barriers are lower the incentives to
anticipate investment in new rms are more pronounced, partially mitigating the
outow of resources towards the trading partner.
The ability of the model to account for the synchronization observed in the data
has often eluded standard international business cycle models that typically predict
too small or negative comovement in response to trade integration - the so called
trade-comovent puzzle.53 For example, Kose and Yi (2001) show that in a standard
53This puzzle is distinct from the puzzles that Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (2000) document; in particular,
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model of international macroeconomics - the Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland (1994)
model augmented with transportation costs - lower trade barriers can yield the
counterfactual prediction of a smaller cross-country output correlation. The reason
is twofold. First, in that model the resource shifting motive is stronger. Second,
demand complementarities generated by plausible reductions of trade barriers are
too weak. Under nancial autarky - where the resource shifting motive is absent -
the predicted synchronization is less than one fourth compared to the data. In other
words, as  falls, country-interdependence is not signicantly a¤ected. The model
lacks of su¢ cient internal amplication: regardless of lower trade barriers, domestic
shocks generate too small and short lasting e¤ects on foreign output uctuations.54
To illustrate the mutually reinforcing role of search frictions and sunk entry
costs, I consider three alternative versions of the model in which I abstract from: (i)
labor market frictions and endogenous variations in the number of rms (a version
of the model which I call BKK); (ii) labor market frictions (the original Ghironi and
Melitz model); (iii) endogenous variations in the number of producers (a version
which I call MP).55 All these alternative versions fail to generate the comovement
observed in the data. Taken in isolation, both endogenous entry and labor market
frictions help the model to get closer to the data, but they fall short of generating
plausible quantitative predictions.56
Panel B of Figure 9 shows that asymmetries in labor markets can dampen the
increase in output comovement, but they do not change the positive e¤ect of trade on
it is di¤erent from the consumption correlation-puzzle. The trade-comovement puzzle is about
the inability of the standard international RBC models to generate a strong change in output
correlations from changes in bilateral trade intensity.
54Output dynamics are primarily driven by the underlying aggrgeate disturbances and economic
mechanisms play a small role in propagating shocks.
55 I impose nancial autarky to mute the resource shifting motive. Hence Im implicitely con-
sidering the more favorable scenario for those models. When I assume nancial integration, the
predicted change in correlation is signcantly lowered.
56Other papers have tried to reverse the counterfactual prediction of the standard international
RBC model about the relationship between trade and comovement. Burstein, Kurz, and Tesar
(2008) show that allowing for production sharing among countries can deliver tighter business cycle
synchronization. Arkolakis and Ramanarayanan (2008) build a model of vertical specialization in
international trade and aggregate uctuations. In their model the degree of vertical specialization
varies with trade barriers and higher vertical trade linkages between countries can induce higher
synchronization of business cycles. Drodz and Nosal (2008) deviate from the standard neoclassical
framework and address the link between trade and comovement in a model featuring a low short-run
price elasticity of trade coexisting with a high long-run price elasticity.
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business cycle synchronization: the sign of the result does not depend on the country-
specic labor market characteristics. What is essential is the endogenous interaction
between product and labor market dynamics, i.e. the time consuming nature of
the matching process combines with the presence of sunk entry costs, changing
the propagation of shocks via trade with respect to a standard international RBC
model. Labor market features of trading partners a¤ect the intensity of the change in
comovement. The reason is twofold. First, when trade opens up between countries
with asymmetric labor markets, there is an asymmetric propagation of external
shocks which is absent in the symmetric case. Second, the resource shifting motive
is stronger when countries have asymmetric labor markets. Lower trade barriers
increase the incentives to shift resources towards the more exible (rigid) economy
in good (bad) times. During worldwide expansions households in the rigid economy
invest abroad, attracted by the relatively higher returns in the exible economy
which exploits its quickly and costlessly ability to reallocate labor (reected in higher
entry protability). On the contrary, during worldwide downturns, incentives are
reverted and resources tend to shift toward the more rigid economy which is somehow
more protected in the aftermath of the negative aggregate shock - ring is more
costly and employment and aggregate demand do not fall abruptly.
2.6.2 Domestic Volatility
Traditional arguments linking output volatility and trade refer either to the in-
creased importance of external shocks or to changes in the degree of diversication
of production across sectors.57 This model highlights three other channels through
which trade integration can (potentially) a¤ect the size of domestic uctuations.
First, as in the original Melitz (2003) model, in presence of heterogenous rms and
xed export costs a reduction of trade barriers lowers the export productivity cuto¤
57For instance, aggregate volatility could increase if production specializes in sectors characterized
by more elastic product demand and factor supply as in Kraay and Ventura (2002) or in sectors
characterized by higher idiosyncratic volatility Cuñat and Melitz (2007). At the same time, if trade
changes the comovement properties of the trading sectors with the rest of the economy, volatility
might decrease. In the model there is no scope for sectorial specialization since the focus is on
within industry trade. Hence only the rst channel is potentially at work here.
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zX and the economy uctuates around a steady state in which a bigger number
of rms is exporting. Under the Pareto parametrization, the density of rms with
productivity zX is bigger - a larger number of rms are in the neighborhood of the
marginal exporter. As a consequence, any given shock triggers a bigger variation
in the number of exporting rms, which, ceteris paribus - tends to increase output
volatility.58
Second as trade opens up, labor market tightness rises and within rm job
destruction falls, reducing the sensitivity of job creation and destruciton to aggregate
disturbances, which, ceteris paribus, triggers a smaller variation of job ows59.
Third, in presence of heterogenous labor markets, di¤erences in cross-country
output dynamics might spillover abroad as trade barriers are reduced.
Figure 11 illustrates the variation in GDP volatility for progressive reductions
of trade costs from high values to the benchmark calibration level. As before, at
the extreme points, the di¤erence in trade costs implies di¤erences in trade volumes
of a factor of 3.5. Trade integration under full symmetry has very small e¤ects on
output volatility. The steady e¤ects in product and labor markets tend to o¤set
each other and the change in volatility is quantitatively negligible.
Panel B instead reveals that lowering trade barriers between countries with asym-
metric labor markets can induce quite sizable e¤ects. In particular, the rigid home
country experiences an increase in output volatility of almost 10%.60 As the co-
movement between the rigid and exible trading partners increases, this result is
not surprising. Since the exible economy is more responsive to shocks, stronger
trade linkages imply that domestic demand in the rigid country becomes relatively
more volatile. Furthermore, lower trade barriers amplify the resource shifting mo-
tive, further increasing output volatility. In the exible economy volatility instead
58di Giovanni and Levchenko (2009) discuss another channel through which long run e¤ects of
trade opennes can a¤ect volatility. In presence of rm heterogeneity and resource reallocation
toward more productive rms the economy might display granula features: idiosyncratic shocks
to individual rms might no longer average out, increasing volatility. In my model, idiosyncratic
job-specic shocks, by construction, a¤ect rms symmetrically and so they completely average out.
59This is true both for rigid and exible labor markets. In a rigid economy, though, the reduction
of labor market tightness and threshold cut o¤ is smaller compared to a exible economy.
60Notice that this result does not imply that the Home rigid economy becomes more volatile than
its exible trading partner.
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falls, even if the absolute change is smaller than what observed in the rigid coun-
try.61 The result is quite suggestive given the fact that Im considering two large
economies and assuming a fully symmetric structure of shocks. In particular, if the
more exible trading partner would also experience relatively higher volatility of
innovations the impact of labor market rigidity for domestic volatility could be even
larger.
As a robustness check I have recomputed the predicted change in comovement
using the parametrization in Baxter and Crucini (1995). Figure 10 show that results
are robust to di¤erent specication of the productivity process.
2.7 Conclusions
In this paper I have developed a two country, stochastic, general equilibrium model
of trade and macroeconomic dynamics with search and matching frictions in the
labor market. I have used this model to study the e¤ects of trade integration
between countries with potentially heterogeneous labor market characteristics. I
have focused on the dynamic e¤ects of trade reforms and on the business cycles
implications of stronger trade linkages. The paper contributes to the trade literature,
which typically focuses only on the long-run e¤ects of trade integration and abstracts
from its e¤ects on uctuations, and the international macroeconomic literature, by
exploring the role of labor market frictions and trade in explaining international
business cycle evidence.
The results indicate that search and matching frictions and their heterogeneity
across trading partners play an important role for the short to medium run e¤ects
of trade integration. Following aggregate shocks, uctuations in job creation and
destruction a¤ect protability of producer entry into domestic and export markets
61This happens since the larger incentives to shift resources over the cycle tend to increase
volatility everywhere, other things equal. For this reason, even if aggregate demand in the exible
country is less volatile after intergration because of the rigidity of the trading partner, the decrease
in volatility is not so pronounced . This seem to suggest that the role played by international
nancial markets is quantitatively important when countries have asymmetric labor markets.
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which in turn feed back into labor market outcomes. The interaction of product
and labor market dynamics that determines the transitional adjustment to trade
integration is also at the heart of the propagation mechanism of business cycle
shocks via trade. Country specic labor market characteristics, by a¤ecting the
behavior of job creation and destruction, impact on entry and export decisions,
inducing asymmetric dynamics between trading partners.
The model predicts that more exible labor markets are a source of competitive
advantage following reductions of trade barriers and gains from trade are dampened
in more rigid trading partners. Nevertheless, concerns about the presence of short-
run negative welfare e¤ects of globalization do not nd conrmation in the model.
Trade, in fact, is found to be benecial at any point in time, even if labor market
outcomes can be negatively a¤ected in the aftermath of integration. Business cycle
implications of stronger trade linkages suggest that the trade expansion from reduced
trade frictions increases comovement across countries. Results indicate that this
e¤ect is stronger if trade integration is preceded by harmonization of labor market
structures. On the other hand, the prediction of increased aggregate volatility for
countries with relatively more rigid labor markets might disincentive labor market
deregulation in such economies.
From a theoretical point of view this paper makes two contributions. First, the
model introduces a source of amplication and propagation of shocks not investi-
gated before, as typical model of international macroeconomics assume Walrasian
labor markets and they abstract from the endogenous determination of the num-
ber of rms serving domestic and foreign markets. The interaction between product
and labor market dynamics in presence of sunk entry costs and search and matching
frictions turns out to be very important in explaining the e¤ects of stronger trade
linkages across countries. Second, I have derived su¢ cient conditions to extend the
original Melitz (2003) aggregation in a dynamic model with labor markets charac-
terized by search and matching frictions (with both job creation and destruction
endogenously determined).
The model abstracts from a number of important features which are left for
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future research. For example, the role of comparative advantage is ignored, as the
focus is restricted to within industry trade. If trade promotes production special-
ization across countries, relative labor market characteristics might contribute to
shape the nature of comparative advantage. As a consequence, there could be ad-
ditional consequences for sectoral and aggregate unemployment and implications
for business cycle dynamics not captured by a one sector model. Moreover, given
the recent interest about the e¤ects of trade integration for ination dynamics, the
model could be extended to include nominal rigidities in order to address this issue.
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Chapter 4
Appendix
Appendix A: Wage Equation
We assume a Nash bargaining between each rm and each worker. Without loss
of generality consider a worker with idiosyncratic productivity zt: The bargaining
solution then splits the surplus of their match in shares determined by an exogenous
bargaining weight . The sharing rule is such that:
 t = (1  )(Wt(zt)  Ut):
where  t is the value of the matched worker for the rm, Wt(zt) represents the
workers asset value of being matched to a job and Ut is the value of unemployment.
We have:
 t(zt) = 'tZtzt   w(zt) + Ett;t+1((1  %ft ) t+1   (1  )G(zt+1)F );
where t;t+1 = (1   )(Ct+1Ct )  is the stochastic discount factor adjusted for
the exit probability. The value of a job depends on real revenue minus the real
wage, plus the discounted continuation value, where  t+1 =
1Z
zct+1
 t+1(z)
dG(z)
1 G(zc) :With
probability (1   %ft ), the job remains active and earns the expected value; the job
is destroyed with probability G(zt+1) and thus there is a ring cost F that the rm
has to pay. For Wt and Ut:
Wt(zt) = wt(zt) + Ett;t+1((1  %ft+1) Wt+1 + %ft+1U;
where Wt+1 =
1Z
zct+1
Wt+1(z)
dG(z)
1 G(zc) :
Ut = B + Ett;t+1(pt(1  %ft+1) Wt+1 + (1  (pt(1  %ft+1))Ut+1):
An unemployed worker receives the unemployment benet B, the discounted
continuation value and the option value of future employment (unless a successful
match is destroyed before becoming productive either because of rm exit or job
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specic destruction).
Inserting the value functions in the bargaining rule yields the equation for the
individual real wage:
wt(z) = ('tZtz + t   Ett+1F ) + (1  )B; (4.1)
where t+1 = (1  pt)Ett;t+1%ft+1:
Appendix B: Symmetry across Incumbents
Here we show that all incumbent rms are symmetric, regardless their period of
entry. It follows that the optimal hiring policy for a new entrant is to post vacancies
to target the end of period size of existing (symmetric) incumbents. We proceed
backwards. First we show that if all the producing rms in a given period t have
the same real marginal cost then new entrants optimally chose to be identical to
incumbents at the beginning of the next period (when they will be starting produc-
tion) - i.e.lIt = l
E
t . Then we complete the proof showing that the real marginal cost
is e¤ectively identical for all the producing rm in a given period of time, regardless
whether or not the rm is a new producer.
Assume that all the producing rm in t - no matter their timing of entry - have
the same marginal cost 't. This implies that each incumbents is charging the same
relative price t since t = (1+
1
Nt
)'t. It follows that each producer faces the same
demand schedule yDt (!) =  ln(
ept
pt(!)
)Yt: The output produced by each incumbent -
expressed in units of the consumption basket Ct - is yt = t(Ztzt(!)lt(!)): In order
to ensure that lt(!) = lt(!0) it must be that zt(!) = zt(!0), i.e. that each incumbent
has the same cut o¤ productivity zCt since zt(!) =
1Z
zc(!)
z dG(z)1 G(zc) :
Take the job destruction equation for two generic incumbents:
't(!) =
1
Ztzct (!)
[B +
1
1   (t  

q(t)
  (1 + t)F ] (4.2)
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't(!0) =
1
Ztzct (!
0)
[B +
1
1   (t  

q(t)
  (1 + t)F ]: (4.3)
The ratio between those two yields:
't(!)
't(!
0)
=
zct (!
0)
zct (!)
:
Under our guess that 't(!) = 't(!
0) we obtain that zct (!) = zct (!0) and hence
lt(!) = lt(!
0) = lt. To complete the proof we need to show that each incumbent has
the same marginal cost 't regardless the timing of entry. That is the marginal cost
depends only on aggregate conditions. Consider the job creation equations for the
incumbents ! and !0and substitute in the corresponding expressions for the wage
rates wt(!) and wt(!0): This yields:

q(t)
= Ett;t+1(1  %t+1(!))[(1  )'t+1(!)Zt+1zt+1(!) + t)

q(t)
= Ett;t+1(1  %t+1(!0))[(1  )'t+1(!0)Zt+1zt+1(!) + t)
For sure zct (!) = z
c
t (!
0) is a solution. We now prove that this is the only
possible solution. To do so we show that F (zct (!)) = Ett;t+1(1   %t+1(!))[(1  
)'t+1(!)Zt+1zt+1(!) + t) is monotonic in z
c
t : From the job creation equation
't(!) =
t
zct (!)
; where t depends only on aggregates variables, and take the rst
derivative of F with respect to zc (we omit the time subscript):
dF
dzc
=   d%
dzc
[(1  )Z~z(!) + ] + (1  %(!))Z dz(!)
dzc
(4.4)
where z(!) =
Z 1
zc
1
a
p
2
exp
  j ln zj2
22 dz: d%dzc  0 since % is the cdf of zc: d~z(!)dzc <
0 ; where ~zt(!) = zt(!)'t(!) is a su¢ cient condition to establish the monotonicity
of F: We now show that this is indeed the case:
d~zt+1(!)
dzc
=   1
z
p
2
exp
  j ln zj2
22 dz < 0 (4.5)
This result completes the proof. Hence zct (!
E) = zct (!
I) = zct , 't(!
I) =
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't(!
E) = 't and hence lt(!
I) = lt(!
E) = lt.
Appendix C: Steady State
Lets express L;M;U; V; p and q as a function of  and zc :
p = 1 " and q =  "
%T =  + (1  )(%+ (1  %)G(zC))):
Using the law of motion of aggregate employment, the denition of U and the
fact that p = MU we have:
L =
p
p+ %T
; U = 1  L; M = %TL
From the matching function:
V = (
%TL

)
1
1 " (1  L) "1 
Given that NE = 1 N , e =
1 
r+d and d = (1  1(N)) YN :
NEe =
((N)  1)
(r + )(N)
Y:
At the same time, using the free entry condition:
NEe =

1  NfE :
Equating these two expression we have:
Y =
((N)  1)
(r + )(N)
fE =

(r + )(1 + N)
fE ;
where (N)= 1+ 1N and fE;t = fR;t +

1 
Lt
q(t)
.
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The steady state average wage rate can be written as:
w = (
N
1 + N
e
  ~N Nt
2 ~NNtZz +    F ) + (1  )B;
where we used the fact that = (1+ 1N )' and = e
  ~N N
2 ~NN . Hence: ' = N1+N e
  ~N Nt
2 ~NNt .Combining
the aggregate resource constraint and the denition of aggregate demand we get:
Y = wL+Nd+ kV;
which can be written as:
N
(r + )(1 + N)2
fR;t +

1  
Lt
q(t)
= ((
N
1 + N
e
  ~N Nt
2 ~NNt Zz + (
%TL
(1  L) )
1
1 "  F ) + (1  )B) + k( %
TL

)
1
1 " (1  L)
"
1 
(SS1)
We still have to use two equations, namely job creation and job destruction:
(1  (1  %T )) 
%T L
(
%T L

)
1
1 " (1 L)
"
1 
= (1  %T )[ N
1 + N
e
  ~N Nt
2 ~NNt z   (( N
1 + N
e
  ~N Nt
2 ~NNt Zz +    F ) + (1  )B)];
(SS2)
N
1 + N
e
  ~N Nt
2 ~NNt z
c
= [B+
1
1   ((
%TL
(1  L) )
1
1 "   
%T L
(
%T L

)
1
1 " (1 L)
"
1 
 (1 + )F ] (SS3)
Recalling that L = p
p+%T
and %T =  + (1   )(% + (1   %)G(zC))); we have a
system of three equations - SS(10), SS(2) and SS(3) - in three unknowns : p; zc and
N . Solving for these three unknown variables as a function of model parameters
allows us to determine the entire steady state of our model economy.
Appendix D: Calibration
A crucial aspect of our model is the distinction between within and across rm
worker separation, a feature absent in a standard "large rm" model of search and
matching frictions. To pin down  and % we use the following procedure.
First notice that total job destruction in steady state is given by jd = %TL  
(1  )%qL. The amount of the overall job destruction induced by the exit of plants
is jdEXIT = L.
Gomez-Salvador, Messina, and Vallanti (2004) report that over the period 1995-
2000, the ration jdL in countries belonging to the Euro area ranged between 3.1% to
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4.3%. We choose midpoint value of 3.5% as our target. At the same time, several
studies for countries belonging to the Euro area report values of jd
EXIT
jd ranging
from 31% to 53% - see OECD (1994). Again, we choose an average value of 40%.
By assuming a total separation rate %T of 4%, we can compute  and % as follows:
 =
jdEXIT
L
jd
L
% =
%T   jdL
(1  )q ;
Appendix E: Wage Equation
I assume a Nash bargaining between each rm and each worker. Without loss
of generality consider a worker with idiosyncratic productivity at and a domestic
producer with productivity z. The bargaining solution splits the surplus of their
match in shares determined by an exogenous bargaining weight . The sharing rule
is such that:
 z;t(a) = (1  )(Wt(a)  Ut):
where  z;t(a) is the value of the matched worker for the rm,Wt(a) represents the
workers asset value of being matched to a job and Ut is the value of unemployment.1
We have:
 z;t(a) = 'z;tzZtat   wt(a) + Ett;t+1( z;t+1  H(acz;t+1)F );
where t;t+1 = (1 )(Ct+1Ct )  is the stochastic discount factor adjusted for the
exit probability. The value of a job depends on current real revenue minus the real
wage, plus the discounted continuation value, where  z;t+1 =
1Z
act+1
 z;t+1(a)dH(a):
Provided the rms is still on the market and the worker is not separated, in t+1 the
match draws a new idiosyncratic productivity a. If a > acz;t+1 the worker contributes
1Notice that workers anticipate that the wage rate is symmetric across all the incumbents.
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 z;t+1(a); otherwise the job is destroyed and the rm must pay ring costs, F .
For Wt and Ut:
Wt(a) = wt(a) + Ett;t+1((1  %) Wt+1 + %Ft+1U
Ut = B + Ett;t+1(pt(1  %Ft+1) Wt+1 + (1  (pt(1  %Ft+1))Ut+1);
where Wt+1 =
1Z
acz;t+1
Wt+1(a)dH(a). An unemployed worker receives the unem-
ployment benet B, the discounted continuation value and the option value of future
employment (weighted by the respective probabilities).
Inserting the value functions in the bargaining rule yields the equation for the
individual real wage:
wz;t(a) = ('z;tzZta+ t + (1  Etz;t+1)F ) + (1  )B (4.6)
where t+1 = (1  pt)Ett;t+1%ft+1:
Appendix F: Symmetric Job Destruction Cuto¤
Here I show that each incumbent has the same marginal workers regardless of the
specic productivity z. The proof is done for the home economy but it is understood
that it applies also to the foreign country.
From the JC equation:

qtZt
+ F| {z }
JCt
= 'z;tz
1R
acz;t
(a  act)dH(a): (4.7)
From JD equation:
'z;tza
c
z;t = Ett+1f(1  )t+1  

qt+1
g+ B + (1 + (1  )Ett+1)F| {z }
JDt
; (4.8)
93
where JCt and 
JD
t depends only on aggregate variables - independent of rms
specic productivity.
From (4.8):
'z;tz =
JDt
acz;t
: (4.9)
Plugging the last expression into (4.7):
F (acz;t) 
1
acz;t
1R
acz;t
(a  act)dH(a) =
JCt
JDt| {z }
Identical for Each Firm
:
To show that acz;t = a
c
t I need to show that F (a
c
z;t) =
JCt
JDt
has a unique solution
- i.e. F (acz;t) is monotonic in a
c
z;t.
Assume a  logN(0; 2A): We can rewrite:
F (acz;t) =
1
acz;tA
p
2
1R
acz;t
e
  (ln(a))2
22
A da  1
A
p
2
1R
acz;t
e
  (ln(a))2
22
A
a
da:
Applying the Leibniz rule it is possible to show that:
dF (acz;t)
acz;t
< 0: Hence there
is a unique solution: acz;t = a
c
t .
Symmetric Wage Rate
Take:
wz;t(a) = ('z;tzZta+ t   Etz;t+1F ) + (1  )B:
From (4.9) and using acz;t = a
c
t :
wz;t(a)  wt(a) = (
JD
t
act
Zta+ t   Etz;t+1F ) + (1  )B| {z }
Only Aggregates
:
It follows that each worker with a given productivity draw a is identical across
all producers. As a consequences:
wz;t  wt =
1Z
act
wt(a)
dH(a)
1 G(act)
:
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Appendix G: Symmetry across Incumbents with Productivity z
Here I show that: (i) all incumbent rms with a draw z are symmetric, regardless of
their time of entry; (ii) the optimal hiring policy for a new entrant with a draw z is to
post vacancies to target the size of existing incumbents with the same productivity
z.
Again, without loss of generality I focus on incumbents and new entrants with
a productivity draw z. I proceed backwards. First I show that for a new entrant in
t is optimal to target the workforce size of existing incumbents if the entrant will
have the same marginal cost of current incumbents in t+1 (when it will begin pro-
duction).Then I complete the proof showing that the real marginal cost is e¤ectively
identical for all the producing rm with productivity z in a given period of time,
regardless of whether or not the rm is a new producer.
Assume that all the producing rm in t with relative technology z - no matter
their timing of entry - have the same marginal cost 'z;t. This implies that each in-
cumbents is charging the same domestic relative price D;t(z) and - if exporting - the
same export price X;t(z) since D;t(z) =

 1'z;t and X;t(z) 
pX;t(z)
P t
=  tQt D;t(z).
It follows that each producer faces the same domestic and foreign demand sched-
ules: yD;t(z) = (D;t(z))
1 Yt and yX;t(z) = (X;t(z))1 Y t : The output pro-
duced by each incumbent - expressed in units of the consumption basket Ct - is
yD;t(z) = D;t(z)(zZtatlD;t(z)) and yX;t(z) = Qt tX;t(z)(zZtatlX;t(z)): Hence it
must be that each rm with productivity z producing at time t has the same stock
of labor.
To complete the proof I show that each incumbent with relative technology z
has indeed the same marginal cost 'z;t regardless of the timing of entry. To see this
it is enough to rewrite (4.8) as:
'z;t =
1
zact
JDt :
All the terms on the RHS are independent of the time of entry. Once again the
result follows from the fact that act and the wage rate are identical across producers.
95
The same reasoning can be applied to any other producer with a di¤erent pro-
ductivity z
0
and it extends to the foreign country.
Appendix H: Calibration
An important aspect of the model is the distinction between within and across rm
worker separation, a feature absent in a standard "large rm" model of search and
matching frictions. To pin down  and %x I use the following procedure. First notice
that total job destruction in steady state is given by jd = %TL  (1  )%xqL. The
amount of the overall job destruction induced by the exit of plants is jdEXIT = L.
Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996) report jdL = 0:052 and
jdEXIT
jd = :2.
By assuming a total separation rate %T of 7%, we can compute  and %x as
follows:
 = jd
EXIT
L
jd
L ; %
x =
%T  jd
L
(1 )q :
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Chapter 5
Tables
TABLE 3
Country Regulation Index Replacement Rate
Austria 35.2 63
Belgium 25.6 61
France 39.3 69
Germany 55.2 75
Italy 62.9 54
Netherlands 43.7 74
Portugal 35.2 83
Spain 84.5 67
Average 47.7 68
See section 3 for details about the index
TABLE 4
Welfare Change Global PMR LMR PMR after LMR LMR after PMR
Long run 10.51 6.1 2.21 10.51 10.51
Transition -1.36 -.85 -.07 -.78 -.64
Net E¤ect 8.96 5.25 2.14 9.73 9.87
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St.Dev. Corr(Yt,Xt) Corr(Xt,Xt 1)
Variable X Data Baseline Data Model Data Model
Y 0.85 0.85 1 1 0.92 0.69
C 0.6 0.45 0.81 0.96 0.88 0.67
W 0.32 0.47 0.59 0.90 0.72 0.47
U 4.95 4.95 -0.9 -0.86 0.96 0.86
V n.a. 5.68 n.a. 0.49 n.a. 0.32
 n.a. 7.57 n.a. 0.93 n.a. 0.48
Corr(U,V) = -0.03 . .
Corr(JC,JD) = -0.23 .
Variable X Full Rigid Flexible PMR Flexible LMR Full Flexible
St. Dev Y 0.85 0.67 0.88 0.81
St. Dev C 0.45 0.48 0.39 0.53
St. Dev U 4.95 3.1 5.46 5.10
Corr(Yt,Yt) 0.69 0.57 0.59 0.55
Corr(Ct,Ct) 0.67 0.56 0.64 0.56
Corr(Ut,Ut) 0.86 0.83 0.75 0.74
TABLE 7 : T IM ING OF THE MODEL
Event
1. Exogenous job destruction (%); Zt is realized;
2. Entry, export decisions
3. New entrants and incumbent rms post vacancies
4. Idiosyncratic shocks ai;t and job destruction;
5. Individual wage bargaining
6. Production with Lt workers
7. Firms exit ()
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TABLE 8 : MODEL SUMMARY - FINANCIAL AUTARKY
1. Discount Factor t;t+1 = (1  )(Ct+1Ct )
 
2. F Discount Factor t+1= (1  pt)Ett+1
3. Employment Lt= ND;tlD;t+NX;tlX;t
4. Domestic Employment lD;t = [1 H(act)][(1  %)lD;t 1 + q(t)vD;t]
5. Export Employment lX;t = [1 H(act)][(1  %)lX;t 1 + q(t)vX;t]
6. Domestic/Export Labor lX;t = Qt (
tzD
zX;t
)1  Y

t
Yt
lD;t
7. Vacancies Vt= ND;tvD;t+NX;tvX;t+NE;t[
lD;t+[1 G(zX;t)]lX;t
qt
]
8. Unemployment Ut= (1  Lt)
9.. Matching F. M(U t; V t) = U
"
tV
1 "
t
10. Tightness t= VtUt
11. Job Finding p(t) =
M(Ut;Vt)
Ut
12. Vacancy Filling q(t) =
M(Ut;Vt)
Vt
13. Aggregate Wage wt= ('tZtat+t Etz;t+1F ) + (1  )B
14. Aggregate JC kqt= 'tZt(at act)(1 H(a
c
t))  F
15. Aggregate JD 'tZta
c
t= [B+
1
1  (t  q(t) (1 + Ett+1)F ]:
16. Price Indexes 1 = ND;t(~D;t)
1 +NX;t(~

X;t)
1 
17. Prots ~dt= ~dD;t+
NX;t
ND;t
~dX;t
18. Domestic Price ~D;t=

 1
't
~zD
19. Export Price ~X;t=

 1
t
Qt
't
zX;t
20. Domestic dividends ~dD;t= 1 (~D;t)
1 Yt
21. Export Dividends ~dX;t=Qt (~X;t)
1 Y t  fX;t
22. Zero Prot Export ~dX;t=  1k ( 1)fX;t
23. Free Entry et= fE;t
24. Entry Cost fE;t = fR;t+
ld;t+[1 G(zx;t)]lx;t
qt
25. Number of Firms NX;t
ND;t
= 1 G(zX;t) = ( zmin~zX;t )
 k( k
k ( 1) )
k
 1
26. Euler eq. (bonds) 1 = (1 + rt)Et(
Ct+1
Ct
) 
27. Euler eq. (shares) ~et= (1  )Et(Ct+1Ct )
 ( ~dt+1+~et+1)
28. Demand Yt= Ct+NE;tfR;t+V t:
29. Accounting Ct+NE;t~et= Nd;t ~dt+ wtLt:
30 Balanced Trade QtNX;t(~X;t)
1 Y t = N

X;t(~

X;t)
1 Yt
Note: I omit equations for the foreign economy. Equations 1-28 hold true for the
foreign country (with a superscript star). Notice that equations (17) and (21) become:
~X;t=

 1Qt

t
't
~z
X;t
and ~dX;t=
1
Qt
(~X;t)
1 Y t  fX;t.
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TABLE 9 : MODEL SUMMARY - BOND TRADING
Home Euler equation (home bonds) C t (1 + Bt+1) = (1 + rt+1)Et[(Ct+1)
 ]
Home Euler equation (foreign bonds) C t (1 + B;t+1) = (1 + r

t+1)Et[
Qt+1
Qt
(Ct+1)
 ]
Foreign Euler equation (home bonds) C t (1 + B

t+1) = (1 + rt+1)Et[
Qt
Qt+1
(Ct+1)
 ]
Foreign Euler equation (foreign bonds) C t (1 + B

;t+1) = (1 + r

t+1)Et[(C

t+1)
 ]
Home Accounting Ct+NE;t~et+Bt+1+QtB;t+1= (1 + rt)Bt+Qt(1 + r

t )B;t+ND;t ~dt+ wtLt:
Horeign Accounting Ct+N

E;t~e

t+B

t+1+QtB

;t+1=
1
Qt
(1 + rt)B

t+(1 + r

t )B

;t+N

D;t
~dt+ w

tL

t :
Home Current Account CAt= (Bt+1 Bt) +Qt(B;t+1 B;t)
Foreign Current Account CAt=
(Bt+1 Bt )
Qt
+(B;t+1 B;t)
International Payments [QtNX;t(~X;t)
1 Y t  NX;t(~X;t)1 Yt] + rtBt+rtB;t= CAt
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TABLE 10 : SYMMETRIC CALIBRATION
Parameter Value Target/Source
Int. Elasticity Sub.  2 Lit
Elasticity Varieties  3:8 Lit
Discount Factor  :99 Lit
Entry Cost fE 1:60 .Data
Export Cost fX 0:013 NxNd = :21
Iceberg trade Cost  1:3 Lit
Pareto Support zmin 1 Norm
Pareto Shape  3:4 sales
Bargaining Power  :5 Lit
Elasticity Matching  :5 Lit
Firing Costs  F 0 Lit
Replacement Rate  B :54 Lit
Firm Exit rate  :02 JD
EXIT
jD
= :20
Exogenous Separation  :012 JD
L
= :052
Home Production hP 1:47 USS = :07
Matching e¢ ciency  :67 qSS = :7
Vacancy Cost k :52 Tot = :07
stD iid Job shocks a :15 uY
TABLE 11 : ASYMMETRIC CALIBRATION
Parameter Value (Rigid) Sources/Target Value (Flexible) Sources/Target
Firing Costs F :20 Data 0 Data
Rep. Rate B :65 Data :54 Data
Matching E¢ ciency { :44 qeu= :7 :52 qusa= :7
Vacancy Cost k :62 TOTeu = :03 :44 
TOT
usa = :07
home Production hP 1:49 Ueu= 0:092 1:47 Uusa= :07
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TABLE 12 : STANDARD DEVIATIONS
U.S. Data Symmetric Rigid Flexible
X
Y
X
Y
X
Y
YR 1:71 1:64 1:42 1:60
CR 0:49 0:68 :58 :67
IR 3:15 3:34 2:84 3:16
U 6:90 6:90 6:2 6:82
V 8:27 4:13 4:45 3:98
 14:06 6:20 5:58 6:34
JC 2:52 2:55 2:45 2:68
JD 3:73 4:10 3:25 3:90
Symmetric Asymmetric
TBR 0:26 :35 :46
Q 4:81 :05 :07
TABLE 13 : AUTOCORRELATIONS
U.S. Data Symmetric Flexible H Rigid F Flexible
YR;t; YR;t 1 :85 :78 :83 :77
Ut; Ut 1 :87 :81 :89 :80
Vt; Vt 1 :90 :41 :52 :39
Symmetric Asymmetric
Qt; Qt 1 :89 :91 :92
TABLE 14 : CONTEMPORANEOUS CORRELATIONS
International Within Country
YR;t; Y

R;t CR;t; C

R;t Lt; L

t
CR;t
C
R;t
; Qt
US Data :351 :207 :360  :35
Symmetric :321 :881 :376  :84
Asymmetric :298 :788 :320  :80
Ut; V t Ut; Y t Ct; Y t It; Y t
US Data  :91  :923 :76 :90
Symmetric  :06  :71 :88 :80
Rigid  :21  :79 :89 :71
Flexible  :04  :71 :88 :78
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Chapter 6
Figures
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Figure 1. Equilibrium in the Labor Market
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Figure 2. Permanent deregulation in the product market - fR.
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Figure 3. Permanent deregulation in the labor market -  R and  F .
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Figure 4. Permanent global deregulation.
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Figure 5. Transitory, persistent negative aggregate productivity shock.
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Figure 6. Transitory, persistent negative aggregate productivity shock: exible vs rigid
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Figure 13. Trade Integration and Domestic GDP volatility.
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